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EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION-WAIVERS UNDER
SECTION 212(c) AND SECTION 244(a)(1) OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
Elwin Griffith*
There are many provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("Act")'
for excluding2 or deporting3 aliens from the United States. Every time an
alien seeks entry4 into the United States, he is confronted by the exclusion
* Dean and Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A., Long Island University, 1960;
J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1963; LL.M., New York University, 1964.
The author is indebted to Lauren.Weil, J.D., DePaul University, 1983, for her research
assistance.
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. There are 33 provisions for excluding aliens. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Unless the requirement is waived by the Act, an
alien who wishes to enter the United States must obtain a visa from an American consul abroad.
Id. §§ 211, 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1182(a)(20) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (immigrants);
id. § 212 (a)(26), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(26) (1976) (nonimmigrants). The consul may refuse to
issue a visa if he believes that the alien is ineligible to receive it under § 212 of the Act. Id.
§ 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976). If the alien obtains his visa, he is still subject to inspection
by an immigration officer when he arrives at a port of entry in the United States. Id. § 235(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1976). If the inspector has any doubts about the alien's eligibility for ad-
mission, he will detain the alien for an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge. Id.
§ 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1976). Sometimes an alien is released on parole and his inspec-
tion deferred to a later date. That action, however, does not result in the alien's admission
to the United States. Id. § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
In exclusion proceedings, the alien has the burden of proof concerning his admissibility. Id.
§ 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1981). He is deportable only to the country from which
he came, or in the alternative, to another country according to the statutory guidelines. Id.
§ 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (Supp. V 1981). Further, he may challenge an exclusion order
in the courts only through habeas corpus proceedings. Id. § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1976).
3. There are 19 grounds for deporting aliens. Id. § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). For example, any alien may be deported who has been convicted of a crime
involving serious moral turpitude within five years of entry, id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)
(1976), or of violating Title I of the Alien Registration Act, id. § 241(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(15)
(1976). An alien also may be deported who, at any time after entry, is or has been a narcotic
drug addict, id. § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1976), or has been convicted of unlaw-
fully possessing an automatic or semi-automatic weapon. Id. § 241(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(14)
(1976).
4. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines "entry" as follows:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a
foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or other-
wise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States
shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes
of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not
intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port
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provisions; after entry, an alien is then subject to the deportation provi-
sions. But the grounds for exclusion and deportation are by no means coex-
tensive. For instance, an alien may commit an offense or suffer an afflic-
tion during his residence in the United States which will cause no difficulty
as long as he remains here. If the alien then departs from the United States,
however, he will be subject to inspection, and possibly exclusion, upon his
attempt to return.' The harshness of this reality is readily apparent when
an alien ventures abroad for a short period after a lengthy stay in the United
States, and is then confronted by the possibility of exclusion for an act com-
mitted many years before.' In the meantime, the alien may have settled into
a comfortable lifestyle, surrounded by family and friends. For such an alien,
exclusion may be a true hardship. Deportation also would impose great hard-
ship upon an alien in similar circumstances, but who has not left the United
States. In response to these situations, Congress enacted certain waiver pro-
visions which allow an alien to seek relief from the Attorney General.' By
and large, such waivers take into consideration an alien's family relation-
ships and his length of residence in the United States.
Section 212(c)8 of the Act provides a way for an alien to counteract the
or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, that no person
whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings,
extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such exception..
Id. § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1976).
5. For example, an alien who has an attack of insanity while living in the United States
is not deportable. If he leaves and tries to reenter, however, he will be confronted with the
provision that excludes "aliens who have had one or more attacks of insanity." See id. § 212(a)(3),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1976).
6. An alien may be deported if he "is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
committed within five years after entry. ... Id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1976).
Under a separate provision of the Act, however, an alien faces exclusion for the same offense
for an indefinite period of time. Id. § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976). For a critique
of this discrepancy in the Act, see generally Gordon, The Need To Modernize Our Immigra-
tion Laws, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1 (1975) (advocating complete revision of the statutory provi-
sions governing deportation and exclusion).
7. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976) (waiver
of exclusion possible for permanent resident returning to lawful unrelinquished domicile of
seven consecutive years except on exclusion grounds relating to disloyalty); id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(h) (Supp. V 1981) (waiver of exclusion possible for an alien intending to immigrate
who is excludable on criminal or prostitution grounds, if exclusion would result in extreme
hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, son or daughter who is a citizen or permanent resident
of the United States); id. § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (1976) (waiver of exclusion possible for
an alien intending to immigrate who is the spouse, parent, or child of a citizen or of a perma-
nent resident of the United States, and who is excludable because of fraud or perjury); id.
§ 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (Supp. V 1981) (waiver of deportation possible for alien who
is the spouse, parent, or child of a citizen or of a permanent resident of the United States,
and who is deportable because he was originally excludable at the time of entry on grounds
of fraud); id. § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (suspension of deporta-
tion possible for alien who has had at least seven years of continuous physical presence in
the United States and whose deportation would cause extreme hardship to the alien, or to
his spouse, parent or child who is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States).
8. Section 212(c) provides as follows:
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exclusion provisions. Its language is directed to the lawful permanent resi-
dent who is returning after a trip abroad. Such an alien may be excludable
on any one of several grounds because, under the Act, his application for
admission on return subjects him to essentially the same scrutiny as on his
first entry as an immigrant. 9 In recognition of the equities which favor a
lawful permanent resident, however, section 212(c) grants the Attorney
General the discretion to admit such an alien who has a lawful unrelinquished
domicile of seven consecutive years, even though the alien may not be eligi-
ble for admission because of a statutory prohibition.'" Initially, section 212(c)
relief was available only to returning resident aliens who were excludable."
The section, however, has been extended to deportation proceedings, thereby
aiding aliens who may not have left the United States.'
Section 244(a)(1) is another helpful provision'3 which provides relief to
an alien who faces deportation under the Act. Under this section, such an
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad
voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a
lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the
discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of paragraphs
(1) to (25), (30), and (31) of subsection (a) of this section. Nothing contained in
this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise the
discretion vested in him under section l11l(b) of this title.
Id. § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
9. Constitutional considerations, however, differ depending on an alien's status. An alien
who is seeking initial admission as a permanent resident has no constitutional rights because
the government may refuse him admission as a sovereign prerogative. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972). On the other hand, as
a matter of due process, a permanent resident alien who is returning from a brief trip abroad
is entitled to a hearing before he can be excluded. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953). The immigration inspector must determine whether the returning alien is seeking
to make an "entry" within the definition of section 101(a)(13) of the Act, and if so, a hearing
must then be granted to determine if exclusion is appropriate. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S.
Ct. 321 (1982). If the returning alien is not making an entry, then he is entitled to a hearing
in deportation proceedings, where the constitutional safeguards are more elaborate. Leng May
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. Such relief, however, is not available to an alien who is excludable on grounds of subver-
sion. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(27)-(29), 212(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(27)-(29),
1182(c) (1976).
11. This restriction seemed reasonable because the statute requires the alien to be "return-
ing to a lawful unrelinquished domicile." Id. § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
12. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (section 212(c) relief available to an
alien convicted of a narcotics offense, who has an unrelinquished domicile of more than seven
years, but who did not depart from this country between date of his conviction and date of
deportation order).
13. Congress initially sought to alleviate some of the hardships which befell aliens by pass-
ing the Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (amending Immigration Act of
February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917)). This statute authorized the Attorney General
to suspend the deportation of certain aliens who could prove at least five years of good moral
character, and whose repatriation would result in hardship to their families. Id. ch. 439 § 20(c),
54 Stat. at 672. A 1948 amendment to the statute required aliens to have seven years of residence
in the United States to be eligible for relief. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948).
Subsequent amendments refined the suspension procedure and resulted in the current version
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alien must forward to the Attorney General an application which states the
basis of his eligibility for relief.14 Upon receiving an application for relief,
the Attorney General must determine whether the alien meets the following
statutory requirements. First, section 244(a)(1) requires the alien's continuous
physical presence in the United States for at least seven years." It also re-
quires a showing that the alien has been a person of good moral character,
and that the alien's deportation will result in "extreme hardship to the alien
or to his spouse, parent, or child" who is a citizen or a lawful permanent
resident of the United States.' 6 When an alien demonstrates statutory eligibility
for relief, the Attorney General will decide whether he will exercise his discre-
tion favorably.' 7 If the alien's deportation is suspended, the alien will be
granted lawful permanent residence."
This article will discuss the different approaches that the Board of Im-
migration Appeals ("Board")' 9 and the courts have taken in the application
and interpretation of sections 212(c) and 244(a)(1). The issue that merits
discussion regarding section 212(c) is whether an alien's lawful domicile of
seven years must begin subsequent to his lawful admission for permanent
residence. With one exception,2  the Board and the courts which have dealt
of the statute. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163,
214 (1952), amended by Act of October 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247,
1247-48 (1962) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The current
version provides as follows:
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discre-
tion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien (other than an alien described
in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) who applies to the Attorney General for suspen-
sion of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provi-
sions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than
seven years immediately preceding the date of such application, and
proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good
moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to
his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
14. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Until recently, Congress had the power to veto the Attorney General's decision to sus-
pend deportation. Id. § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976). In INS v. Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983), the Supreme Court held this power to be unconstitutional.
18. The Act defines the term "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" as "the status
of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed."
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976).
19. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") is authorized by regulation and its members
are appointed by the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1983). It is primarily an appellate
tribunal and its decisions are binding on the immigration judges and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("Service") unless the Board states otherwise. Id. § 3.1(g).
20. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977); see infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
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with this question have determined that only those years of lawful domicile
which occurred subsequent to admission for permanent residence should be
considered for purposes of section 212(c) relief.2 ' This article, however, will
advance arguments against the prevailing interpretation of the section. In
so doing, it will examine the legislative history with a view toward putting
the issue in its proper perspective.
With respect to section 244(a)(1), this article will discuss the Supreme
Court's decision in INS v. Wang22 concerning the Board's role in defining
extreme hardship, and the courts' role in reviewing the Board's decisions.
It also will be helpful to review the criteria for meeting the requirement of
continuous physical presence, and to discuss how an alien's absence from
the United States may meaningfully interrupt that presence.2" Finally, there
will be an examination of the requirement of good moral character as well
as an examination of the changes affecting that requirement that have resulted
from the 1981 amendments to the Act." '
SECTION 212(c) WAIVER
Section 212(c) currently requires that an alien who seeks relief thereunder
must have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, must have gone
abroad voluntarily, and must be returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile
of seven consecutive years." Two significant elements of section 212(c) must
be highlighted. The alien must have the status of a lawful permanent resi-
dent and his domicile must be lawful. Neither of these requirements was
contained in the seventh proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of
1917,26 the precursor to section 212(c). Therefore, it was possible for an
alien to seek relief under the seventh proviso regardless of whether his status
or entry was lawful. This situation led to legislative reform of the seventh
21. See, e.g., Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1981) (waiver under §
212(c) unavailable where an alien was convicted for the unlawful possession of cocaine 10 years
after his initial entry, but only one year after he was admitted as a permanent resident), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1982); Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th. Cir. 1979) (section 212(c)
relief denied to an alien, convicted of inducing the entry of illegal aliens, who had resided
in the United States for 12 years, 9 of which preceded admission for permanent residence);
In re Newton, 17 1. & N. Dec. 133 (1979) (section 212(c) relief denied to an alien who was
convicted of grand larceny two years after he became a permanent resident and 17 years after
he first entered the United States); In re Anwo, 16 1. & N. Dec. 293 (1977) (appeal of deporta-
tion order denied when alien convicted of illegal possession of marijuana had resided in the
United States for eight years, only four of which followed admission as a permanent resident),
aff'd per curiam, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
22. 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam).
23. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 2(c),
95 Stat. 1611 (1981).
25. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
26. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (1917).
1983]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
proviso2" because Congress was concerned that aliens who would not qualify
for admission could by some means gain entry to the United States and
subsequently petition for relief on the ground that they had satisfied the
domiciliary requirement." The same possibility for relief existed in the case
of aliens who had overstayed their visas. There was also congressional con-
cern that aliens who entered the country illegally would use the preexamina-
tion procedure for relief under the seventh proviso, thereby returning to the
United States with a visa from an American consulate in a foreign country.' 9
Therefore, an alien who was initially ineligible for a visa on a particular
statutory ground might be able to circumvent the statute and eventually ac-
complish his goal of staying permanently in the United States.
Because of this application of the seventh proviso to circumvent the ex-
clusion provision, Congress made sure that section 212(c) required the alien's
domicile to be "lawful." 3 But when the section was restricted to "aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence," confusion arose as to whether
the alien's lawful domicile of seven years had to begin subsequent to his
lawful admission for permanent residence.
The Establishment of Domicile
a. The Board in In re S.
The significance of an alien's domicile first arose in In re S. 3' In that
27. In 1947 the Senate authorized an investigation into the immigration system. See S. Res.
137, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 10,348 (1947). A report issued from that investiga-
tion and a part of that report dealt with the seventh proviso. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 382-384 (1950); see also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653.
28. In its report on the immigration system, the Senate Judiciary Committee gave some
examples of how the seventh proviso operated and commented that the "result is that the
Attorney General may exercise his discretionary authority and authorize the admission of an
alien notwithstanding the fact that there is a conviction in the record of his case which or-
dinarily would preclude his lawful entry." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1950).
29. The Senate Judiciary Committee report, in referring to the method by which an illegal
alien could eventually gain permanent residence in the United States, stated as follows:
After a period of 7 years or more, [an alien] may have acquired a family or prop-
erty here and established in his own mind an intent to remain permanently in this
country. When the alien is apprehended by the immigration authorities or he feels
that he will be apprehended, he applies for a preexamination border crossing iden-
tification card with a view to going to an American consulate in Canada to apply
for an immigration visa. When he applies for that card, a preexamination hearing
is held by the immigration authorities and it is found that it is a seventh proviso
case and the Attorney General has discretionary authority to admit him into the
United States as an immigrant for permanent residence, since he is returning to
this country, after a temporary absence, to an unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years.
Id.
30. The seventh proviso did not require the alien's domicile to be lawful. By imposing that
requirement, § 212(c) took care of many congressional concerns. Compare Act of February
5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (1917) (repealed 1952) with Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
31. 5 I. & N. Dec. 116 (1953).
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case, the alien had established only four years of lawful permanent residence
but he already had spent eight years in the United States as an illegal alien.
In 1953 he wanted to leave the United States temporarily. Therefore, he
asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("Service") for advance
clearance32 because he had committed an offense which would have foreclosed
his return.3 Mindful of his unlawful status prior to 1949, the alien argued
that his domicile during the period preceding his admission for permanent
residence did not have to be lawful and that his sojourn of eight years
satisfied the terms of section 212(c).34 His claim for relief rested on the separa-.
tion of the word lawful from the requirement of an "unrelinquished domicile
of seven consecutive years."
The Board's response in this case seemed to treat the terms "lawful en-
try" and "lawful admission for permanent residence" as synonymous. The
Board stated that the "provision of law is available only to those lawfully
resident aliens who are returning to an unrelinquished domicile of seven con-
secutive years subsequent to a lawful entry."35 Had the Board stopped there,
it would have clearly designated the alien's ineligibility for section 212(c)
consideration because of his prior unlawful status; the alien simply did not
have a lawful status for the required seven-year period. When the Board
concluded that the seven-year domicile must follow lawful admission for
permanent residence,36 it went beyond what was necessary for resolution of
the case." The alien's predicament called for resolution of whether his unrelin-
quished domicile had to be lawful for the entire period. If the answer was
yes, then his length of domicile would be measured only from the time of
his lawful entry.3" The Board's decision that section 212(c) was available
only to those aliens who had seven years of unrelinquished domicile subse-
quent to admission as a lawful permanent resident did not consider either
the case of an alien's lawful entry as a nonimmigrant or the relationship
between nonimmigrant status and domicile. The Board's language might have
led one to believe that the alien could have made a lawful entry only if
he were a lawful permanent resident.39 Perhaps this language has caused
the greatest confusion because an alien's lawful domicile can originate in
32. Advance clearance was an exercise of the seventh proviso prior to departure. See In
re B., 1 I. & N. Dec. 204 (1942); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 7.4a, at 7-40, 7-41 (1982).
33. In 1940 and 1941, the alien apparently had committed perjury, a crime involving moral
turpitude. 5 1. & N. Dec. at 116.
34. Id. at 117.
35. Id. at 118.
36. Id.
37. See Comment, Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 771, 788-89 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Lawful Domicile].
38. An "entry" is "any coming of an alien into the United States .. " Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976). Therefore the term would
apply to both immigrants and nonimmigrants.
39. A lawful permanent resident is an alien who has been granted the right to remain per-
manently in the United States, such status not having changed. Id. § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(20) (1976).
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either immigrant or nonimmigrant status, thus satisfying the Board's con-
tention that both the admission and the period of residence must be lawful."'
In finding that the plain language of section 212(c) required the seven
consecutive years of lawful domicile to follow the alien's entry for lawful
permanent residence, the Board did not give any lengthy rationale for its
conclusion, but referred instead to the statute's legislative history."' The Senate
committee report 2 to which the Board referred highlighted the language
"established after a lawful entry for permanent residence" 3 which was sug-
gested for insertion in the seventh proviso but which was eventually omit-
ted. In its report, the House Judiciary Committee acknowledged that prior
to the enactment of section 212(c), aliens could be admitted at the discre-
tion of the Attorney General without ever being lawfully admitted to the
United States." However, there seemed to be no language in any of the
legislative history requiring the seven-year period of domicile to follow the
alien's lawful admission for permanent residence. Thus, it was rather startl-
ing for the Board to construe "the plain language of section 212(c)" as it
did in In re S.4"
b. The Second Circuit in Lok v. INS
The Board's decision in In re S. remained unchallenged until Lok v. INS
(Lok 1).", In Lok I, a deportation order was entered against an alien seaman
who had remained in the United States beyond his authorized stay. 7 Subse-
quently, he married an American citizen and was allowed to remain in the
United States while his petition for an immigrant visa was processed." After
his marriage, the service brought a deportation proceeding against him because
of his conviction for possession of narcotics. At the deportation proceeding,
he had to prove seven years of lawful domicile if he wanted to obtain relief
under section 212(c). 9 His only hope for relief lay in the possibility that
the period prior to his lawful admission for permanent residence would be
40. 5 1. & N. Dec. at 118.
41. Id.
42. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 382-84 (1950).
43. Id. at 384.
44. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1653.
45. The plain meaning rule calls for language to be given its natural meaning unless restricted
by some other provision or inconsistent with legislative history. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 48-49 (4th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1982).
46. 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
47. A deportation order was entered against Tim Lok on October 26, 1965. In re Lok,
15 1. & N. Dec. 720, 720 (1976).
48. He had become eligible to apply for the visa because of his marriage on February 23,
1968, to an American citizen. In re Lok, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Immigration
and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976)).
49. He conceded deportability at a deportation hearing on April 21, 1975, but sought relief
under § 212(c) of the Act. Id. at 38-39.
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considered part of the required domicile."0 Predictably, the Board followed
its own decision in In re S."1 The alien challenged the Board's position;
therefore, the Second Circuit in Lok I had to respond to the alien's arguments
that section 212(c) did not require the alien's domicile to follow his lawful
admission for permanent residence.
Initially, the Second Circuit recognized that it was customary to defer to
the interpretation of the agency charged with administering the Act."2 The
court, however, also understood that it should not defer to "administrative
decisions that are inconsistent with a statutory mandate or which frustrate
the congressional policy underlying legislation."' 3 The court's subsequent
reluctance to defer was prompted by the Board's reasoning in In re S., which
seemed to equate the terms "lawfully admitted for permanent residence"
and "lawful unrelinquished domicile."' 4 The court stated explicitly that these
terms were not synonymous and that an alien could in fact establish lawful
domicile without being admitted for permanent residence." Given that
possibility, the rationale for the Board's approach seemed to weaken; when
the Service conceded that a literal reading of the statute did not support
its position, 6 the rationale faded entirely.
Next, the court considered the legislative history of section 212(c).' 7 The
court viewed the Senate committee's discussions as requiring a result dif-
ferent from that reached by the Board. The court implied that the Senate
50. Although Tim Lok entered the United States as a seaman in 1959, he did not leave
when his authorized stay expired. Id. at 38. Through administrative discretion, Tim Lok managed
to stay in the United States until October 25, 1971, when he left for Hong Kong to obtain
a permanent resident visa. Id. He returned to the United States as a lawful permanent resident
on December 26, 1971. In re Lok, 15 I. & N. Dec. 720, 721 (1976). Thus, Lok had spent
approximately 12 years in the United States prior to his lawful admission as a permanent resident.
51. In re Lok, 15 1. & N. Dec. 720, 721 (1976) (citing In re S., 5 1. & N. Dec. 116 (1953)).
On July 30, 1976, the Board affirmed the Service's decision that Lok was ineligible for relief
because he had not been a permanent resident for seven consecutive years. Id. Thus, the Board
held that only a lawful permanent resident could meet the "lawful unrelinquished domicile"
requirement of § 212(c). Id.
52. 548 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)).
53. Id. (citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965)).
54. Id. at 39 (quoting In re S., 5 1. & N. Dec. 116, 118 (1953)).
55. Id. at 40. To support its holding, the court unfortunately gave an example which is
not supported by the Act. The example was stated as follows: "If a student . . . had resided
here for three years, married an American citizen, obtained an appropriate visa for admission
to permanent residence and then committed a deportable crime four years later, he certainly
would have achieved a 'lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years.' " Id. The
difficulty with this example is that for an alien to have a student visa, he must have a residence
abroad which he has no intention of abandoning. Immigration and Nationality Act §
101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. § lI01(a)(15)(F)(i) (Supp. V 1981). Therefore, in the court's example,
the alien's initial three years as a student could not be counted towards the "lawful unrelin-
quished domicile" requirement. See In re Anwo, 16 1 & N. Dec. 293, 298-99 (1977), aff'd
per curiam, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
56. 548 F.2d at 39.
57. Id. at 40-41 (quoting S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950); H.R. REP.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653, 1705).
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committee's proposal to limit section 212(c) relief to those aliens whose
domicile was "established after a lawful entry for permanent residence" would
have restricted the section markedly." To the court, the section was not
so limited inasmuch as the section was designed to provide relief for deserv-
ing aliens with family ties in this country. 9
The Lok I court's approach to the domicile question was sound. On the
other hand, the Board had assigned no meaning to the fact that the language
"established after a lawful entry for permanent residence" was eventually
omitted from section 212(c). Surely, if that phrase had been included in the
statute, the required domicile would have to begin after, not before, the
alien's lawful admission for permanent residence. By expressly refusing to
adopt the "establishment" language, however, Congress demonstrated an
intent to require only that the alien have the status of a lawful permanent
resident on his return to his lawful domicile of seven consecutive years.6"
Further, the existence of the lawful domicile status does not depend at all
on the assumption of permanent residence because domicile may be assumed
by some nonimmigrants. 6 ' Thus, according to Lok I and a correct inter-
pretation of section 212(c), a lawful permanent resident62 of one day's stand-
ing could be returning to a domicile which he established as a nonimmigrant
and still be ensured protection.
There is indeed no consolation to be found in the Board's view that the
enacted language carried out congressional intent.63 This view would sup-
port the contention that having the status of a lawful permanent resident
on reentry to a lawful domicile is synonymous with returning to a domicile
established after admission as a lawful permanent resident. There is a distinct
difference between the two situations, and it is difficult to believe that the
Senate committee deliberately settled on the current statutory language if
it wanted to insure that section 212(c) relief would be available only to lawful
permanent residents of seven years standing."' In any event, even if the am-
biguity exists, it should be resolved in the alien's favor. Although the statute
was intended to restrict the flow of illegal aliens into the United States and
58. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950)). The committee's pro-
posal involved modifying the term "domicile" by adding the phrase "established after a lawful
entry for permanent residence." Id. This proposal would have resulted in making § 212(c)
relief unavailable to aliens whose admission for permanent residence did not pre-date seven
years of domicile. Id.
59. Id. at 41; see also C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 32, § 7.4c, at 7.50.
60. For the current version of § 212(c), see supra note 8.
61. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)
(1976) (domicile assumed for ambassadors and their attendants); id. § 101(a)(15)(G), 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(15)(G) (1976) (domicile assumed for government representatives, international organiza-
tion officers and employees/attendants).
62. See id..§ 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1976).
63. See In re Newton, 17 I. & N. Dec. 133, 136 (1979).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
65. In Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948), the Supreme Court articulated the proposition
that since deportation is a drastic measure, equal to banishment, the deportation provision
of the Act should be given a narrow construction. This proposition has evolved into the princi-
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to prevent abuses of the preexamination procedure, these objectives were
achieved in large measure by the requirement that the alien must have gone
abroad voluntarily and not under deportation, and that he must be returning
to a lawful domicile. The statute, however, remains ameliorative and there
is no rationale for torturing the plain language66 to accommodate the sup-
posed legislative intent when Congress has been able to state'its intent very
clearly in other contexts when lawful permanent residence for a certain period
was necessary.67
c. Subsequent Developments
Undaunted by the Second Circuit's approach in Lok I, the Board in In
re Anwol8 stated that it found no evidence of congressional intent to confer
the benefits of section 212(c) on aliens who "may have eked out all or part
of seven years of 'domicile' while here as a nonimmigrant." ' 9 The Board
relied on a vague expression of congressional intent that time spent as a
nonimmigrant should not be counted towards section 212(c) relief because
that status does not show any attachment to this country."
The assurance of continuing affiliation with this country is a reasonable
requirement which is met by the alien's assumption of permanent residence.
Permanent resident status becomes the alien's public affirmation of his in-
tent to remain here indefinitely. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand
why, for example, a permanent resident of seven years necessarily has any
ple of statutory construction that ambiguities in the Act are to be resolved in favor of the
alien. See Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Mashi v. INS, 585 F.2d 1309, 1316 (5th
Cir. 1978); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1977). Nevertheless, while recognizing that
principle, some courts have strictly construed the Act to reject an alien's claim. See, e.g., Pacheco
v. INS, 546 F.2d 448, 449 (lst Cir. 1976) (court viewed congressional intent as requiring a
restrictive interpretation of the Act with respect to an alien convicted of crimes of moral tur-
pitude); Garcia-Gonzales v. INS, 344 F.2d 804, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1965) (court maintained that
congressional intent required strict interpretation of the Act regarding aliens convicted of nar-
cotics violations).
66. In In re S., 5 I. & N. Dec. 116 (1953), the Board acknowledged that the "plain language
of section 212(c)" and a "review of the historical background of the legislation" led to the
conclusion that the section was available only to resident aliens who were returning to a lawful
unrelinquished domicile subsequent to a lawful entry. Id. at 118. The Board then recovered
quickly in the next breath by clarifying that it meant that the alien must have resided in the
United States for seven consecutive years subsequent to such "lawful admission for permanent
residence." Id. The Board must have realized its imprecision. Returning to a domicile established
subsequent to a lawful entry is certainly not the same thing as returning to a domicile estab-
lished subsequent to admission for permanent residence. In any event, if the section's language
is plain, there should be no necessity to resort to its legislative history for help in ascertaining
its meaning. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 45, § 46.01, at 48-49.
67. See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 316(a), 319(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1430(a)
(1976) (naturalization provisions).
68. 16 1. & N. Dec. 293 (1977), aff'd per curiam, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
69. Id. at 296.
70. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1365,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1705).
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greater attachment to the United States than a permanent resident of five
years with prior credit of ten years domicile as a nonimmigrant.1 Surely
in the latter instance there is ample evidence of the alien's close ties to this
country." If the objective is to provide relief for aliens with a certain degree
of attachment, then the requirement of a seven-year domicile as well as per-
manent residen't status should be sufficient to secure that relief. 3
The Board also observed in Anwo that Congress did not anticipate that
nonimmigrants would reside in the United States for a long period of time
before obtaining permanent residence status, thereby qualifying them for sec-
tion 212(c) relief.74 This was a perplexing observation because there is no
minimum period of residence required before a nonimmigrant can become
a lawful permanent resident.7" Therefore, it is misleading for the Board to
suggest that an alien would have to remain here for many years before quali-
fying for permanent residence and section 212(c) benefits. There are, of
course, certain requirements for obtaining permanent residence, but length
of stay is not one of them.7" Thus, the question is not whether a nonim-
migrant who has sequestered himself for an extended period is availing himself
of some undeserved immigration benefits. Instead, the question is whether
71. See Comment, Lawful Domicile, supra note 37, at 792 and nn. 127-28.
72. Some nonimmigrants may stay a long time in the United States because of their jobs.
Unlike students, such aliens are not required to agree that they are not abandoning their
foreign residence. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
ll01(a)(15)(A) (1976) (ambassadors and their attendants); id. § 101(a)(15)(E), 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(15)(E) (1976) (treaty trader); id. § 101(a)(15)(G), 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(15)(G) (1976) (govern-
ment representatives, international organization officers and employees, and their attendants).
73. In contrast, Congress has established the rigorous requirement of physical presence as
an important factor in the suspension of deportation provision. Id. § 244(a)(1), § 1254(a)(1)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). In § 244(a)(1), seven years of continuous physical presence is required,
while in § 244(a)(2) 10 years is required if suspension of deportation is sought for an alien
who has committed certain serious offenses. Id. § 244(a)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (2)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). There is, however, no requirement of lawful admission for permanent
residence in the suspension of deportation provision.
74. 16 1. & N. Dec. at 296. The Board expected a nonimmigrant "to enter, accomplish
the purpose of his visit, and to leave within a relatively short period of time." Id. This expec-
tation did not, however, take into account the many nonimmigrants who came into this coun-
try for extended periods and who can legally establish domicile. See supra note 72.
75. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
76. A nonimmigrant may seek to obtain permanent residence by applying for an adjust-
ment of status. id. To do so, such an alien must be eligible for an immigrant visa. Id. In
order to be eligible for an immigrant visa and for permanent residence, an alien must not
fall within any of the classes of excludable aliens. Id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). Examples of excludable aliens include the following: (1) aliens who are likely
to become a public charge; (2) aliens who have sought to procure or have procured a visa
or other documents by fraud or misrepresentation; and (3) aliens who the Attorney General
has reason to believe have sought to enter the United States solely to engage in activities which
would endanger the nation's welfare, safety, or security, or would be prejudicial to the public
interest. Id. Further, the availability of immigrant visas is largely determined by a scheme of
categorizing aliens, and granting one category preference over another. Unmarried sons or
daughters of United States citizens receive the highest preference. Id. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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a lawful permanent resident will qualify for section 212(c) benefits if part
of the domiciliary period is satisfied while he is a nonimmigrant.
There is no evidence that Congress objected to the establishment of domicile
in this manner. In situations in which Congress has wanted to require a
certain period of permanent residence before aliens could qualify for specific
benefits, it has done so clearly.77 In the legislative history of section 212(c),
there is no evidence that Congress intended to deny the benefits of the sec-
tion to aliens who enter as nonimmigrants. Not even the Anwo approach
would dictate that result.78 Therefore, the issue is whether domicile must
be restricted to lawful permanent residents, and if not so restricted, whether
section 212(c) nevertheless requires that the seven-year period of lawful
domicile must follow the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence.
The Anwo interpretation that "lawful unrelinquished domicile" can be
established only after admission for lawful permanent residence is inconsis-
tent with the notion that nonimmigrants can establish lawful domicile without
ever having applied for permanent status.79
A Fourth Circuit case, similar to the one before the Board in Anwo, is
Chiravacharadhikul v. INS."° In Chiravacharadhikul, relief under section
212(c) could have been granted to an alien whose domicile was established
during his nonimmigrant status. The alien had been a nonimmigrant employee
of a foreign government and he held an A-2 visa, 8 which under the statute
did not prevent him from acquiring a lawful domicile. Yet, a majority of
the court felt compelled to follow the Board's view that an alien's domicile
must be established after his admission as a permanent resident.2 The Fourth
Circuit's deference to the Board was founded on the theory that Congress
would not have tolerated indefinitely a statutory construction which did not
reflect its intent. 3 This deference was inappropriate, however, and the case
77. One example is the naturalization provision, where the prerequisite of a five year period
of lawful permanent residence has the objective of nurturing the alien's commitment to a new
country, and of preparing him for citizenship. Id. § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976).
78. Even under the Board's approach in In re Anwo, 16 1. & N. Dec. 293 (1977), aff'd
per curiam, 607 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1979), an alien who entered as a nonimmigrant would
still be eligible for relief under section 212(c) once he had been domiciled here for seven years
after adjustment of his status to a lawful permanent resident.
79. See Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
893 (1982); Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Lok, Int. Dec. 2878 (1981).
80. 645 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1982).
81. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(ii) (1976).
82. 645 F.2d at 251. The court also noted that even if the alien could satisfy the residency
requirement, he should be denied section 212(c) relief because of his involvement in cocaine
distribution. Id. at 249.
83. The court believed the Board's interpretation to be neither "inconsistent nor unjustified."
Id. at 251. It is true that "[l]ong-continued contemporaneous and practical interpretation of
a statute ... constitutes an invaluable aid in determining the meaning of a doubtful statute."
2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 45, § 49.03, at 233. Further, if that interpretation has gone
unchallenged for a long time, that will be an important consideration in construing the statute.
Id. § 49.07, at 251-52. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Board has consistently
applied its interpretation since In re S., and congressional inaction to the 1953 Board inter-
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provided a perfect opportunity for the court to give meaning to the clear
language of the statute.4 This was not a situation in which particular exper-
tise in immigration law was required for an appropriate interpretation of
the provision. Furthermore, the court should have determined that the Board
abused its discretion by refusing to rely on the plain meaning of the statutory
language. There does not seem to be any ambiguity in the statutory language
which would call for uncompromising deference to agency interpretation in
this case.8" Yet the court stated that this was " 'an ambiguous provision with
little legislative history to clarify how Congress intended it to be applied.' "86
Contrary to the court's assertion, however, legislative history of the provi-
sion does exist, and it reveals the concerns that were discussed and the sug-
gestions that were made by members of Congress. 7 The Board's ad-
ministrative conclusion with respect to these discussions should not be con-
trolling if it frustrates the legislative policy underlying the statute, which
centered around alleviation of the hardship that might befall an alien who
was excluded from these shores after establishing close ties in this country.8"
Another defect of Anwo, which went unrecognized by the Fourth Circuit
in Chiravacharadhikul, was that the Board put itself in a quandary by sug-
gesting that the suspension of deportation provision, section 244(a)(1), would
be greatly weakened by separating the requirement of lawful permanent
residence from that of domicile in section 212(c).8 9 The Board's argument
was that an alien who sought relief under section 244(a)(1) had to show
not only that he was a person of good moral character, but also that his
deportation would cause extreme hardship to certain relatives who were
United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.90 On the other hand,
it was believed that since those strict qualitative standards were missing from
section 212(c), it would be appropriate to require stronger ties on the part
of those aliens who sought relief under that section. 9' Notwithstanding the
pretation does not form a good basis for inferring congressional ratification of the Board's
interpretation. See id. § 49.10, at 261-62.
84. If language is not to be accorded its natural or usual meaning, then it should be shown
that some other provision restricts its meaning or that it is inconsistent with legislative history.
2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 45, § 46.01, at 49. Moreover, the plain meaning should be
upheld even if it provides some-mistaken legislative policy as long as it does not produce an
absurdity. Id. at 18 (Supp. 1983).
85. It is clear that administrative interpretation carries great weight in ascertaining the meaning
of a statute. Id. § 49.05, at 238. But the question was whether there was anything to interpret
or whether it was just a matter of giving meaning to clear and unambiguous language. Id.
§ 46.01, at 48-49.
86. 645 F.2d at 250 (quoting Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1979)).
87. See S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 382-84 (1950). For a full discussion of
the legislative history of § 212(c), see supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
88. See Chiravacharadhikul, 645 F.2d at 252 (Haynsworth, J., dissenting); Comment, Lawful
Domicile, supra note 37, at 791 & nn.120-21.
89. Anwo, 16 1. & N. Dec. at 297-98.
90. Id. at 297.
91. Id. at 297-98. Section 212(c) does not require a showing of good moral character or
extreme hardship. Therefore, it was argued that to approximate those requirements of section
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Anwo Board's observations on this point, it ignored the extensive review
required of aliens seeking permanent residence.92 Further, the legislators did
not intend to create an overlap by applying both sections 212(c) and 244(a)(1)
to deportable aliens. Rather, it was envisioned that section 212(c) would apply
only to returning residents whose domicile was lawful.9 3 It was not until
recently, in Francis v. INS,9" that the section was held equally applicable
to deportable aliens. Thus, any existing incongruity resulting from Francis
should have no bearing on the meaning of section 212(c) in the context of
Anwo. The Board's concern that other provisions of the Act might be under-
mined by too liberal an interpretation of section 212(c) seemed unwarranted
under these circumstances.
It is unfortunate that the Second Circuit, in Lok I," is the only court
to disagree with the results reached by the Board in In re S. and Anwo.
Other courts have followed the holding in In re S., though with some hesita-
tion concerning its statutory interpretation. For example, in Castillo-Felix
v. INS,96 the Ninth Circuit would only speculate about the Senate Judiciary
Committee's rejection of language that dealt with the establishment of the
alien's domicile. 7 It is unclear why the court believed that the committee
might have regarded the language as superfluous.98 If the committee assumed
that it had properly conveyed its intent through the statutory language, but
in fact an ambiguity resulted, it would seem that the section should be read
liberally in the alien's favor.99 This interpretation is entirely reasonable in
light of the court's opinion that the language of section 212(c) "could sup-
port either the [Service's] interpretation or that adopted in Lok.' ' 10 Given
the court's view, a construction in favor of the alien would have provided
an incentive for congressional clarification of the section.
While conceding the ambiguity of section 212(c), the court in Castillo-
244(a)(1), it was logical to require that after his lawful admission for permanent residence the
alien have seven years domicile.
92. See Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 469 (9th Cir. 1979) (Tagasuki, J., dissenting).
Judge Tagasuki declared that "the broad discretionary powers available to the Attorney General
in granting lawful permanent residence could, and presumably do, serve a function equal in
stringency to the establishment of good moral character and extreme hardship under § 244(a)." Id.
93. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 272-73 (under equal protection clause, an alien is eligible for § 212(c) relief, even
though he did not leave the United States after committing the offense that would render him
excludable).
95. See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
96. 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979). Petitioner illegally entered the United States in 1963, was
granted permanent residence in 1972, and was convicted of knowingly inducing the illegal entry
of two aliens in 1975. He conceded deportability, but was denied § 212(c) relief because he
had not been lawfully and continuously domiciled in the United States for seven years subse-
quent to his admission for permanent residence in 1972. Id. at 461.
97. Id. at 465.
98. Id. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the Senate subcommittee "might have considered
[the establishment language] superfluous, believing that the enacted version adequately con-
veyed their intent that admission for permanent residence precede the seven years of domicile." Id.
99. Id. at 468 (Takasugi, J., dissenting); see also cases cited supra note 65.
100. 601 F.2d at 464.
19831
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Felix maintained that the Act's definition of lawful permanent residence'0 '
did not necessarily negate congressional intent that lawful permanent residence
be a prerequisite to the establishment of lawful domicile.' 2 The difficulty
with such a position is that according to the Act, there are some nonim-
migrants who can establish lawful domicile without being admitted as lawful
permanent residents.' 3 Although the number of nonimmigrants in that group
may be small in comparison with the number of aliens lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, ' the existence of those nonimmigrants destroys
the possibility of equating lawful domicile with lawful permanent residence.
Section 212(c) requires that to obtain relief, an alien need only be lawfully
admitted for permanent residence and be returning to a lawful unrelinquished
domicile. If domicile can be established without lawful admission for per-
manent residence, then the language of section 212(c) should be interpreted
with reference to the other provisions of the Act allowing for that possibility.
If the period of domicile was intended to be only that time following the
alien's lawful admission for permanent residence, then it may be argued that
qualifying domicile with the word lawful is redundant. In other words, there
would be hardly a case where a lawful permanent resident would be return-
ing to an unrelinquished domicile which was not lawful. ' For example,
a permanent resident is one who has been accorded the right to stay per-
manently in the United States.'0 6 If the domicile contemplated in section
212(c) is to ensue from lawful admission for permanent residence, then the
domicile would be clearly lawful provided the alien's status has not changed.
Therefore, it is possible that Congress contemplated the alien's return to
a domicile established before the alien's admission for permanent residence,
but which might be termed unlawful in whole or in part. In fact, legislative
history indicates that Congress was concerned about aliens who were still
101. For the Act's definition of "lawfully admitted for permanent residence," see supra note
18.
102. 601 F.2d at 464.
103. Certain nonimmigrants are not required to maintain a foreign residence or to be in
the United States for a temporary purpose. See supra note 72. The Castillo-Felix court recognized
that such aliens would be able to establish a lawful domicile without having been admitted
as lawful permanent residents. 601 F.2d at 464 n.12.
104. The following figures are illustrative:
CLASS OF ADMISSION
Nonimmigrants (Oct. 1, 1978-June 30, 1979)
Foreign government officials 48,165
Treaty traders and investors 36,975
Representatives to international organizations 27,823
Representatives of foreign information media 7,906
NATO officials 4,530
Immigrants (Oct. 1, 1978-Sept. 30, 1979) 460,348
1979 INS Statistical Yearbook 7. These figures illustrate that the number of nonimmigrants
only represents approximately 20% of the total number of aliens entering the United States.
105. The Board conceded in In re Lok that "it is illogical to conclude that the domicile
of one who retains his lawful permanent resident status could be anything but lawful." Int.
Dec. 2878 at 7 (1981).
106. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(20) (1976).
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eligible for relief after entering the United States with forged documents or
without inspection. ' Though such aliens may have been residents of long
standing, there was considerable legislative sentiment that the statutory
loophole had to be closed to preclude their eligibility for relief."'8 Within
that context, the application of the word lawful to the unrelinquished domicile
of seven consecutive years makes sense and is not redundant because relief
would be available only to aliens who are returning to a domicile of lawful
origin.
Lawfulness of Domicile
Although the Act does not define the term domicile, it is generally ac-
cepted that domicile generally refers to the place that one intends to call
one's permanent home." 9 It is, however, the lawfulness of the domicile that
is important in section 212(c). It was this aspect of section 212(c) that Tim
Lok had to deal with in the second round of his judicial skirmish.
When the Second Circuit found in favor of the alien in Lok I, " it did
not settle the entire controversy. The alien still had to show that he had
established lawful domicile for at least seven years. Therefore, the matter
was remanded for determination of that question. After an unfavorable Board
decision,'" Tim Lok again went before the Second Circuit in Lok v. INS
(Lok 11). 2 This time, he did not achieve the success of his first venture.
107. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 382 (1950). For further discussion of congres-
sional intent to limit the availability of relief from exclusion, see supra text accompanying notes
26-30.
108. It was proposed that the seventh proviso be abolished because it helped "the bad alien
to remain in the United States," while keeping out "the potential good and law-abiding citizen."
S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 382, 383 (1950).
109. See Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435, 437 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 2 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.4b, at 7-46. The Act does, however, define the term "residence"
as the "actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent." Immigration and Nationality
Act § 101(a)(33), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (Supp. V 1981); see also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 665 (1978) (the Court indicated that a nonimmigrant student could not lawfully maintain
a domicile in the United States because a nonimmigrant student is defined as "an alien having
a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning . . .and who seeks
to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing .. . a course
of study") (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(F)
(1976)).
110. 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
111. In re Lok, Int. Dec. 2878 (1981).
112. Lok v. INS (Lok I), 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982). On November 8, 1979, in an un-
published opinion, the Board upheld the Service's decision that Lok had not established lawful
domicile prior to his lawful admission in 1971 because he was in the United States illegally
until that time. Id. at 108-09. Lok again petitioned the court of appeals, arguing that he had
been a permanent resident since December 26, 1971, and that he had established seven years
of lawful domicile since then. Id. at 109. The government agreed that the case should be remanded
to the Board on that question. Lok v. INS, No. 50-4076 (2d Cir. June 18, 1980). On July
31, 1981, the Board denied Lok § 212(c) relief. 681 F.2d at 109. The Board held that Lok
could not have established legal domicile before his admission for permanent residence in 1971
because he was in the United States illegally. Id. The Board also held that Lok's permanent
residence, and therefore his domicile, was terminated when the order of deportation, resulting
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This result was by no means a total surprise; his ability to establish domicile
before lawful admission for permanent residence did not negate the require-
ment that he establish lawful domicile.
Tim Lok's first problem was that he had overstayed his admission as a
seaman," 3 and thus, he was in the United States illegally between the ex-
piration of his lawful stay and the date of his lawful admission as a perma-
nent resident. Therefore, even if he had been able to establish domicile for
that period, it would not have been lawful under these circumstances. Lok's
hopes for relief were dashed because no statutory credit was granted for
the period of residence which preceded his lawful admission in 1971. The
court had no choice but to affirm the Board's decision that Tim Lok had
failed to meet the requirements of section 212(c), because his 1968 marriage
to an American citizen did not convert his illegal status into lawful domicile.I"
Further, although Lok was allowed to remain for a period of time as a
matter of administrative discretion, that did not legalize his status.'' 5 Thus,
before his admission as a permanent resident in 1971, Tim Lok was still
an illegal alien.
Once Tim Lok was admitted in 1971, he was able to establish lawful
domicile." 6 In the Board's view, that lawful domicile terminated when the
Board affirmed the denial of section 212(c) relief on July 30, 1976." ' Lok,
however, did not appeal the immigration judge's May 29, 1975, finding of
deportability.'1' Therefore, the Second Circuit maintained that the deporta-
tion order became final ten days later ' 9 and that this ended his lawful
domicile. 2 At that point, Tim Lok's only defense to deportation was an
appeal for discretionary relief under section 212(c). The court, therefore,
seemed to differentiate between administrative finality with respect to the
issue of deportability and administrative finality concerning the denial of
section 212(c) relief.' 2 ' In this respect, the court was more severe than the
Board in establishing the time at which when the alien's lawful domicile
should terminate. Thus, under these circumstances, if an alien wants to
from his conviction, became final on July 30, 1976. Int. Dec. 2878 (1981). The Second Circuit
affirmed the Board's decision on June 1, 1982. Lok v. INS (Lok I), 681 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1982).
113. An immigration officer may grant an alien crewman permission to land, such landing
not to exceed 29 days. Immigration and Nationality Act § 252(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1282(a) (1976).
114. 681 F.2d at 108-10.
115. Id. at 110.
116. Id. at 108.
117. In re Lok, Int. Dec. 2878 at 10. Lok had been found deportable as an alien convicted
of a narcotics violation under the Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(23), 241(a)(11),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(23), 1251(a)(11) (1976).
118. An alien has the right to appeal an immigration judge's decision on deportability. 8
C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 242.21 (1983).
119. 681 F.2d at 110. The court noted that tinder the pertinent regulations a deportation
order is final unless an appeal of the order is commenced within 10 days from the issuance
of the order. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.21, 243.1 (1983).
120. 681 F.2d at 110.
121. Id.
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preserve the lawfulness of his domicile, he should lodge an appeal not only
from an adverse decision under section 212(c) but also from a finding of
deportability.'1 2 In so doing, he can protect his interest in extending his lawful
domicile as long as possible.
In Lok II, the alien raised an interesting point to support the claim that
his domicile in the United States was lawful prior to his admission for per-
manent residence. He argued that his domicile was lawful from the date
of his marriage in 1968 because the Service allowed hint to stay pending
issuance of his immigrant visa in Hong Kong."2 3 The alien's intent to re-
main here was clear; thus, there was no doubt about his domicile. The dif-
ficulty with Lok's argument, however, was that he had breached his nonim-
migrant status and therefore his status in the United States was no longer
lawful. The grant of voluntary departure'2 4 was available to him only as
a matter of discretion and arose out of deportation proceedings which en-
sued from his overstay. Lok, however, urged the court to recognize his in-
tent to establish domicile in the United States. If Lok had not violated the
terms of his nonimmigrant status, the Board would have had to contend
with different considerations. For instance, a nonimmigrant who maintains
his proper status and then applies for adjustment to immigrant status'25 may
argue that his domicile should be recognized from the date of his applica-
tion. By initiating this change, an alien would be indicating that he has every
intention of abandoning his residence abroad'26 and his visit could no longer
122. See 59 Interpreter Releases 423, 444 (1982). A recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit
declined to follow the Lok I] decision with regard to when an alien's lawful domicile ends.
Marti-Xiques v. INS, 713 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir. 1983). The Marti-Xiques court reasoned
that an alien who has been granted relief under § 212(c) would retain a lawful intent to remain
in the United States. Id. at 1517-18. Further, the court maintained that Lok H encouraged
appeals of all deportation orders. Id. at 1518.
123. 681 F.2d at 108.
124. The Attorney General has the discretion to allow a deportable alien to depart voluntar-
ily at his own expense, except where he is subject to deportation for certain serious offenses.
Immigration and Nationality Act. § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (Supp. V 1981). Thus, a deport-
able alien almost routinely asks for voluntary departure. There are some advantages to leaving
voluntarily rather than being deported. Voluntary departure avoids a record of deportation
and allows the alien to choose his method of departure, thereby giving him some flexibility
as to time. See E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798
-1965, 571-72 (1981). Furthermore, a disadvantage of deportation is that before reentering
the United States, an alien must obtain the Attorney General's permission. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (Supp. V 1981).
125. The Act provides as follows:
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the
alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States
for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him
at the time his application is filed.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1976).
126. The definitive language that isolates a bona fide nonimmigrant from others is that he
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be characterized as temporary. It would seem, therefore, that an alien in
this situation should be able to include the interim period between the filing
and the approval of his adjustment application as part of the period of
domicile for purposes of section 212(c).' 7 This theory would benefit the alien
only if it is agreed that his lawful domicile may precede his admission as
a lawful permanent resident.
Other Features
The Lok II decision was significant because it highlighted the time at which
an alien's lawful domicile terminates, at least within the deportation con-
text. It was only a matter of time before the Board was asked to decide
whether the Lok II principle-that lawful domicile terminates upon a final
deportation order-applied in exclusion proceedings. The issue arose because
the Board had ruled earlier in In re M."'I that an alien's lawful domicile
terminated when he reentered the United States after an event which rendered
him excludable.' 29 The Board's ruling was based on the theory that when
the reentry occurred after such an event and within seven years of the alien's
initial lawful admission for permanent residence, the alien could not comply
with the lawful domicile requirement of section 212(c).130 Further, the Board
found it irrelevant that the formal finding of excludability did not occur
until after the expiration of the seven-year period.' 3 ' Finally, in In re
Duarte,'32 the Board applied the Lok II principle to exclusion proceedings,
thus overruling In re M. by requiring a final adjudication of excludability
to terminate an alien's lawful domicile.'
33
Another issue regarding section 212(c) relief is its applicability to aliens
facing deportation. On its face, section 212(c) applies only to aliens who
has "a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning .... See,
e.g., id. § 101(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(F)(i) (Supp. V 1981) (nonimmigrant student).
127. This alien's status would be different from that of an alien who already has breached
his status. Section 245 specifically provides for adjustment of status so that the alien would
not be here on sufferance. See id. § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
128. 7 I. & N. Dec. 140 (1956).
129. Id. at 142.
130. Id.
131. Id. The alien was lawfully admitted for permanent residence on December 22, 1945.
Id. at 140. She was convicted of shoplifting on February 27, 1950, and was admitted to a
mental institution on May 10, 1950. Id. Therefore, when she reentered the United States on
March 3, 1952, she had not yet completed seven years residence and, in any event, she was
then inadmissible because of her insanity.
132. Int. Dec. 2926 (1982).
133. In In re Duarte, the alien was a lawful permanent resident who left and returned to
the United Stateg within seven years after his initial admission but after his narcotics convic-
tion. Id. at 2. Having been convicted, he was excludable on reentry. Id. Under In re M.,
his lawful domicile would have ended on that return, but the Board in Duarte added the fur-
ther requirement of a final adjudication. Id. at 3-5; see also In re Gunaydin, Int. Dec. 2925
(1982) (final deportation order required to terminate alien's lawful status because it is not
automatically terminated by entry without inspection).
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are facing exclusion after returning from a visit abroad.'" At first blush,
the language does not seem to include aliens who may be subject to depor-
tation because they are within the United States. It was not long before the
Board had to consider the question of whether the section should apply to
such aliens. In re G.A." 5 involved an alien who was convicted of a nar-
cotics offense in 1947 and was temporarily absent from the United States
in 1952. During deportation proceedings in 1956, the alien argued for the
applicability of section 212(c) on the basis of his reentry in 1952.136 The Board
agreed with the alien's contention, giving section 212(c) a nunc pro tunc
application.'37 This was a liberal interpretation, but one that still assumed
that the alien had left and reentered subsequent to the occurrence which
rendered him deportable. Several years later, the Board also extended sec-
tion 212(c) to deportation proceedings when the alien applied for adjust-
ment of status under section 245.'38 The extension of this remedy was rather
logical, because in the section 245 proceeding the alien is subject to all
grounds of exclusion available under section 212(a).' 39
The issue of the applicability of section 212(c) to deportation proceedings
arose in Francis v. INS.'"" In Francis, the alien had not left the United States
subsequent to the event which rendered him deportable.' 4 ' The Second Cir-
cuit was faced with the question of the propriety of differentiating between
aliens who had left and aliens who had remained within the United States.
The court found that there was a violation of equal protection because the
distinction drawn between these two classes of aliens was "not rationally
related to any legitimate purpose of the statute."'"2 In scrutinizing the statute,
134. For the text of section 212(c), see supra note 8.
135. 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1956).
136. Id. at 275.
137. Id. at 275-76.
138. In re Smith, 11 I. & N. Dec. 325 (1965). Smith, a native of England and a British
citizen, had been twice convicted of disorderly conduct, a "crime involving moral turpitude."
Deportation proceedings were instituted under § 241(a)(4). Id. at 325. Smith then submitted
an application for adjustment of status under § 245, and also requested discretionary relief
under § 212(c). Id. at 326. The Board, in granting relief, reasoned that an alien who seeks
adjustment of status is subject to the same scrutiny as an alien who seeks entry into the United
States. Id. at 327.
139. A nonimmigrant applying for permanent residence must be eligible to receive an im-
migrant visa. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1976). Excludable
aliens are those who, for a variety of reasons, are ineligible to receive visas. Id. § 212(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Thus, an alien applying for adjustment of status
under § 245 is subject to the § 212(a) grounds of exclusion.
140. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
141. Francis was admitted as a permanent resident in 1961. He was convicted of possession
of marijuana in 1971, but did not leave the country after his conviction. Discretionary relief
under § 212(c) was denied and a final order of deportation was entered on August 14, 1974.
Id. at 269.
142. Id. at 272. The court's use of an equal protection theory was appropriate because, just
as equal protection would be applicable to state action under the fourteenth amendment, it
is also applicable through the due process clause of the fifth amendment in the case of federal
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the court determined that it discriminated against aliens whose uninterrupted
residence had indicated stronger ties to this country than those of aliens who
had resided here intermittently." 3 The Francis court held that permanent
resident aliens who are within a particular group must be treated identically
unless there are some criteria that can support different treatment in fur-
therance of a legitimate governmental interest.'" It was not surprising,
therefore, that the Ninth Circuit' 5 and the Board" 6 soon followed the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision.
Although the court in Francis extended the protection of section 212(c)
to aliens in deportation proceedings, it did not expand the grounds upon
which relief may be granted. Thus, the application of section 212(c) created
no difficulty when the ground for exclusion also constituted a ground for
deportation. When a deportable alien sought section 212(c) relief, however,
and the ground for deportation was not a ground for exclusion, the Board
was reluctant to grant relief.'' Therefore, the section is not available to
an alien who is deportable on some ground which is not reflected in the
exclusion statute.' The Board has held, however, that the section is ap-
plicable to any deportation ground that is substantially similar to an exclu-
sion ground.' 4 9 Further, because section 212(c) is specific in making relief
available to those aliens who are excludable under "paragraphs (1) through
(25) and paragraphs (30) and (31)" of section 212(a),15 aliens who are ex-
cludable on other grounds are not within the ambit of section 212(c) relief. 5'
action. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation in District of Col-
umbia schools held vi6lative of due process under the fifth amendment); see also J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383 (1978) (equal protection
guarantees apply to the federal government through the fifth amendment due process clause);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 992 (1978) (the requirement of equal treatment under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment is indistinguishable from the limitations imposed
upon the states by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
143. 532 F.2d at 273; see also Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1981) (when
an alien has demonstrated close ties to the United States by his continued presence, he is not
deserving of less consideration than an alien who was not continuously present in this country).
144. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273.
145. Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981).
146. In re Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (1978); In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26 (1976).
147. In re Granados, 16 1. & N. Dec. 726 (1979) (section 212(c) relief denied to an alien
convicted for possession of a concealed sawed-off shotgun, which renders the alien deportable
under Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(14) (1976), but does
not constitute a ground of exclusion under Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (1976)).
148. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.4b, at 7-45 (Supp. 1983).
149. In re Salmon, 16 1. & N. Dec. 734 (1978) (section 212(c) waiver available to an alien
convicted of robbery, which constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning
of Immigration and Nationality Act § 214(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4), and Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976)).
150. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976).
151. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.4b, at 7-45 (Supp. 1983).
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SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
Section 212(c) provides a remedy only for lawful permanent residents. There
is, however, another section of the Act which is not limited to lawful per-
manent residents and which provides discretionary relief for certain depor-
table aliens who are in the United States. Section 244(a)(1)' s2 authorizes the
Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation if the alien can
demonstrate the following: (1) that he has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of at least seven years; (2) that he
has been a person of good moral character; and (3) that his deportation
would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, or child,
who is a citizen of the United States or a permanent resident alien. By its
own terms, the section is available only to deportable aliens and it does not
apply in exclusion proceedings.' The goal of the section is not only to sus-
pend the alien's deportation but also to grant him permanent resident status.
If the statutory conditions are met, the Attorney General must then decide
whether he will exercise his discretion favorably.
Statutory Considerations
a. Extreme Hardship
One of the most troublesome elements of section 244(a)(1) is the require-
ment of proving extreme hardship. The issue of extreme hardship was con-
sidered recently by the United States Supreme Court in INS v. Wang.' ""
The aliens in that case alleged that if they were deported, they would suffer
severe economic loss because of the forced liquidation of their business, and
because their children would be deprived of the educational opportunities
available in the United States.'" The Board found that these allegations con-
stituted mere economic detriment which was insufficient to meet the statutory
requirement of extreme hardship.' 6 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reversed
the Board's decision not to reopen the case, and remanded for a hearing
on the merits.' 7
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the alien's
motion to reopen should not have been granted.' 5 8 The Court based its rul-
ing on two grounds. First, the lower court erred in not requiring the alien
to support his motion by affidavit or other evidentiary material.' 59 Second,
152. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V
1981). For the text of section 244(a)(1), see supra note 13.
153. The section gives the Attorney General the discretion to "suspend deportation" of cer-
tain eligible aliens. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
154. 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam).
155. Id. at 142.
156. Id.
157. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1980).
158. 450 U.S. at 146.
159. Id. at 143.
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and more importantly, the Ninth Circuit had substituted its own concept
of extreme hardship for the Board's, thereby encroaching upon the author-
ity granted by Congress to the Attorney General and his delegates.' 60 Con-
sequently, the Court declared that it was not the appellate court's function
to suggest another construction absent a finding that the Board had abused
its discretion.'' The Supreme Court allowed the Board to give a narrow
construction to the term "extreme hardship" because of the exceptional nature
of the suspension remedy; 62 such a construction was found to be consistent
with the Service's interest in reopening only cases which present new material
evidence.' 63 Otherwise, the floodgates would be open for the reconsidera-
tion of cases with frivolous claims of hardship, and the courts would be
further embroiled in the adjudication of deportation matters.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wang clearly recognized the Attorney
General's role not only in deciding whether to reopen an alien's case, but
also in articulating the ingredients of extreme hardship. 6 Although there
is considerable interest after Wang in the elements of extreme hardship, courts
seem to be paying much more attention to how the Board reaches its deci-
sions on that question. 6' Therefore, the more searching inquiry is whether
the Board's decisions are arbitrary or capricious, and whether they are based
simply on factors taken in isolation, rather than as a whole. It is not that
160. Id. at 144; see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1983) (the Board in its discretion may grant or
deny a motion to reopen).
161. 450 U.S. at 144.
162. Id. at 145. The Court was quite accurate in regarding suspension of deportation as
an exceptional remedy, thus justifying the Board's narrow view of the ingredients of extreme
hardship. The early statutory version required "serious economic detriment." Alien Registra-
tion Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20(c), 54 Stat. 672 (1940). The 1952 Act required "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 244(a)(1),
66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). The 1962 amendment changed the requirement to "extreme hardship"
for aliens who were subject to deportation under § 244(a)(1). Act of October 24, 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247, 1247-48 (1962) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The 1962 amendment, however, retained the more stringent standard
of the 1952 Act for aliens who were deportable under § 244(a)(2) for subversive activities,
failure to comply with, or convictions under, the Alien Registration Act of 1940, or felony
convictions for drug trafficking, prostitution, illegal possession of firearms, or illegal importa-
tion of aliens. Id., 76 Stat. 1244, 1247-48 (amending Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 244(a),
66 Stat. 163, 214); see also E. HUTCMINSON, supra note 124, at 568-71 (discussing the evolution
of the present provisions governing suspension of deportation).
163. 450 U.S. at 145.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (no abuse of discretion
where the Board considered economic detriment separate from hardship to alien's children because
the facts, even when considered together, did not constitute extreme hardship); Ravancho v.
INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981) (abuse of discretion where Board failed to consider material
evidence previously unavailable in conjunction with the entire record); Perez v. INS, 643 F.2d
640 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (abuse of discretion where Board's conclusion that aliens failed
to establish a prima facie case of extreme hardship was based on an inadequate record), amended,
665 F.2d 269 (1981), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 320 (1983); Aguilar v. INS, 638 F.2d 717
(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (no abuse of discretion where rational basis exists for Board's
finding of no extreme hardship).
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courts are attempting to impose their own definition of "extreme hardship"
on the Board, because after Wang they know that such an approach is
untenable. They want to ensure, however, that the Board does not overlook
the cumulative impact of the alien's allegations.
A variety of factors can result in a finding of extreme hardship because
the determination is made on the facts of each case. 166 Many of the factors
address the age and the health of the alien, his family relationships, his
economic situation, and his period of residence in the United States.' 67 If
the Board fails to consider all the factors involved in an alien's claim of
extreme hardship, then the Board has abused its discretion. 1'6 8 Therefore,
the Board is not free to consider economic factors affecting the alien's claims
of extreme hardship if at the same time it ignores other important aspects
of the alien's case." 9 Although economic detriment by itself is not sufficient
to constitute extreme hardship under the statute," ' other factors may join
with it to tip the scales in the alien's favor."'
Although the argument is usually unsuccessful, aliens often assert that
relocation to their native country will result in a lower standard of living
due to their inability to find comparable employment." 2 The Ninth Circuit,
166. Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1980) (" 'Extreme hardship' is not a
fixed and inflexible term"); see also INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (per curiam) (although
a flexible term, the definition given by the Attorney General is favored); 2 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.9d, at 7-164 to 7-165 (discussing the impracticality of establishing
fixed categories of conditions amounting to extreme hardship and the consequent need for case
by case evaluation).
167. In re S., 5 1. & N. Dec. 409, 410-11 (1953); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra
note 32, § 7.9d, at 7-164 to 7-165.
168. See, e.g., Santa-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (failure to con-
sider alien's asserted inability to find employment); Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794, 797 (3d Cir.
1980) (failure to consider hardship to alien's grandchild); Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651, 655
(9th Cir. 1979) (failure to consider personal hardship); see also Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682
F.2d 143, 145-46 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1982) (no abuse of discretion where Board considered all
relevant evidence before it); Chang v. Jiugni, 669 F.2d 275, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(no abuse of discretion where Board considered all factors and found no extreme hardship).
169. See, e.g., Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1979) (failure to consider
noneconomic hardship was considered error).
170. Balini v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Chang v. Jiugni, 669
F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1982); Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS, 664 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1981);
Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Jong Shik Choe v. INS, 597
F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1979)).
171. See, e.g., Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1981) (remand for Board's
consideration of noneconomic factors, such as personal hardship resulting from separation
from family); Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1979) (remand for consideration
of noneconomic factor of emotional impact resulting from alien's permanent separation from
his two-year-old son); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1978) (re-
mand to consider effect of separation from family members who are U.S. citizens in conjunc-
tion with a consideration of economic factors); Yong v. INS, 459 F.2d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir.
1972) (per curiam) (remand to consider effects of separation from alien's husband who was
lawfully within the U.S. as a student).
172. See, e.g., Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1982) (conditions in
alien's homeland not dispositive in a suspension hearing); Carnalla-Munoz v. INS, 627 F.2d
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however, in Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 73 found that the Board had
misconstrued the alien's hardship as mere "economic detriment" when in
fact the alien had asserted that he would be completely unemployable upon
return to his native country.'" The court maintained that there was a
"qualitative difference" between economic detriment and absolute
unavailability of employment. 7 ' Therefore, it was arbitrary and irrational
for the Board to characterize the alien's claim of hardship as mere economic
detriment simply because the claim was related to employment possibilities.' 76
However, when the alien in Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon' equated his plight
with that of Mr. Santana-Figueroa, he found the Seventh Circuit unrespon-
sive. This result was not surprising when one considers the physical condi-
tion of each petitioner; Mr. Bueno-Carrillo was in good health and nothing
prevented him from seeking employment,' 8 while Mr. Santana-Figueroa was
an elderly alien who had a physical disability which foreclosed any possible
employment.' 7 9 Mr. Santana-Figueroa's condition was serious enough for the
Ninth Circuit to suggest that deportation would deprive him of "the means
to survive.""'8 The Seventh Circuit saw a difference between the two situa-
tions and interpreted Mr. Bueno-Carrillo's contentions as merely claims of
a reduction in his standard of living."' Therefore, inability to obtain similar
employment was not enough to constitute extreme hardship.
The decision in Santana-Figueroa has not received universal approval. In
Ahn v. INS, 2 another panel of the Ninth Circuit seemed singularly unim-
pressed with the decision, finding that the court in Santana-Figueroa had
strained to reverse the Board in spite of Wang."3 The question arises,
however, whether the court itself strained to affirm the Board in Ahn-
especially since the court stated that the Board's opinion did not demonstrate
that the factors in the case were considered cumulatively." ' The lack of clarity
in the Board's decision led a dissenting judge to question whether the ma-
1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1980) (depressed economic conditions in Mexico did not justify suspension
of deportation); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977) (hardship resulting
from economic conditions in alien's homeland insufficient to warrant stay of deportation); Pelaez
v. INS, 513 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (economic conditions in Philippines
do not warrant suspension of deportation); In re Anderson, 16 1. & N. Dec. 596, 598 (1978)
(economic conditions in alien's homeland relevant when combined with other adverse factors).
173. 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
174. Id. at 1357.
175. Id. at 1356.
176. Id. at 1357.
177. 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982).
178. Id. at 146.
179. 644 F.2d at 1356 (Santana-Figueroa was 70 years old, unskilled, uneducated and had
an injured leg).
180. Id.
181. 682 F.2d at 146.
182. 651 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).
183. Id. at 1287 n.1.
184. Id. at 1287.
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jority was "unduly influenced by the wash of the wake of Wang.""' He
was concerned with the Board's language, which suggested that a certain
type of detriment "alone" did not constitute extreme hardship and that other
factors were to be considered but were not conclusive. 86 Consequently, there
was a lingering doubt as to whether the Board had really considered the
cumulative effect of the alien's claims. Such a concern appears reasonable
in light of the court's uncertainty about the Board's approach. Further, a
failure to consider the cumulative effect of the alien's claim would create
a basis for remand consistent with the rule in Wang, which forbids the court
from substituting its judgment of extreme hardship for that of the Board
absent a finding that the Board abused its discretion.
In Ahn, the court rejected the argument that the alien would experience
extreme hardship because his political activity abroad would make it dif-
ficult for him to get a job at home. The court relied on the Board's posi-
tion that political claims must be brought under section 243(h)181 rather than
section 244(a) of the Act.'"I The Ninth Circuit's apparent sweeping rejection
of any hardship claim that had political overtones was unintended. Instead,
the court wanted to avoid an alien's reliance upon "a claim of persecution
to make up the deficit" under a hardship claim.' 9 When an alien experiences
hardship in the form of political persecution, section 243(h) provides the
appropriate remedy by requiring that an alien's deportation be withheld if
such alien's life or freedom would be threatened.' 9 ° It is possible, however,
for an alien to experience economic detriment as a result of political prob-
lems without jeopardizing his life or freedom. While it is established that
economic factors alone do not give much weight to a hardship claim,' 9 they
185. Id. at 1288 (East, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V 1981) (pro-
viding that no alien shall be deported whose life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his political opinion).
188. The Ahn majority interpreted the Board's decision in In re Kojoory, 12 1. & N. Dec.
215 (1967), as rejecting politically-based claims from consideration under § 244(a). 651 F.2d
at 1288. On the other hand, Judge East, in his dissent, interpreted the Kojoory decision as
rejecting the alien's claim only after the Board had determined whether "there would be limited
economic opportunities due to political persecution." 651 F.2d at 1288 (East, J., dissenting).
189. 651 F.2d at 1288 (quoting In re Kojoory, 12 1. & N. Dec. at 219-20). But cf. 2 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.9d, at 7-164. These commentators stated as
follows: "Board dicta suggest that anticipated persecution cannot be considered as hardship
for this purpose. These dicta are unsound, since the prospect of persecution seems to entail
the highest degree of hardship." Id.
190. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V 1981).
191. See Pelaez v. INS, 513 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (difficulty in obtain-
ing employment in Philippines not enough to suspend deportation); Cheung v. INS, 422 F.2d
43, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (difficulty in securing employment and reduction in wages
not sufficient hardship to suspend deportation); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir.
1968) (inability to obtain work in chosen field does not constitute hardship); In re Lam, 14
I. & N. Dec. 98, 99 (1972) (inability to find job and be self-supporting does not constitute
hardship); see also 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.9d, at 7-162 ("It has
been said that economic detriment alone may not be enough to qualify for relief.").
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should not be dismissed solely because of their political origin, because they
may be persuasive when combined with other factors. There must be many
situations in which an alien would find it difficult to survive economically
because of the repercussions of his political beliefs rather than because of
the general economic conditions existing in his native country. There may
be no threat to an alien's life or limb, but the political forces may operate
to make life extremely hard for him. In a proper case, it should be possible
for that alien to prove his extreme hardship regardless of the political over-
tones involved.
Another type of hardship upon which aliens base claims for section 244(a)
relief involves medical problems.'92 In these situations the alien is hard-pressed
to meet the test of extreme hardship unless he can show that adequate medical
care is unavailable in his own country. The alien's failure to carry this burden
of proof usually will deprive him of this basis of relief.'93 He may, however,
establish extreme hardship without such proof by demonstrating the detrimen-
tal effects of uprooting a person afflicted with a particular medical
condition.'9 4 When the alien does demonstrate these factors, and the Board
fails to consider them, the Board has abused its discretion'"-just as it would
be an abuse of discretion if the Board refused to consider any factors bear-
ing on the determination of extreme hardship.'96
b. Relatives Affected
The extreme hardship upon which an alien predicates his claim for sec-
tion 244(a)(1) relief may affect the alien or his spouse, parent or child.' 97
192. See, e.g., Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1982) (epileptic child), rev'd on
other grounds, 52 U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984); Chang v. Jiugni, 669 F.2d 275 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (variety of medical problems including chest pains and high blood
pressure); Hamid v. INS, 648 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1981) (poor host resistance and multiple allergic
history of alien's child).
193. Hamid v. INS, 648 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1981) (alien denied relief for failure to
establish a prima facie case of hardship); cf. Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1982) (absence of proof of inadequate medical care not dispositive in all cases).
194. Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 52
U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984).
195. Id.
196. See Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) ("When important
aspects of the individual claim are distorted or disregarded, denial of relief is arbitrary.");
Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1979) (insufficient consideration of noneconomic
hardship was error).
197. See Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981) (hardship to alien's child, who was
a U.S. citizen); Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981) (hardship to alien's three
children, one of whom was a permanent resident alien); see also INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139,
144-45 (1981) (per curiam) (upholding Board's finding that neither aliens nor their children
would suffer extreme hardship); Mwasi v. INS, 625 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding Board's
denial of eligibility under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981), based on a claim of hardship to alien's stepson and estranged wife). Furthermore,
an alien cannot gain favored status solely based on a claim of hardship to a child who is
a U.S. citizen. See, e.g., Vaughn v. INS, 643 F.2d 35, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (suspension of
deportation denied despite hardship to children because parent alien chose to rely unnecessarily
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Thus, the statute takes account of the disruption that might occur in the
alien's immediate family if the alien is deported.' 98 There are, however, situa-
tions in which the alien's deportation may affect a close relative who does
not fall within the designated group.
The issue of the availability of section 244(a)(1) relief where relatives out-
side the designated group are involved arose in Tovar v. INS. ' In Tovar,
the Third Circuit was persuaded that the alien's relationship to her grand-
child was so similar to the parent-child relationship that the hardship to the
grandchild should be considered in determining the alien's eligibility for relief
from deportation.2"" Although this holding had the effect of expanding the
statutory definition of child, the court reasoned that this expansion beyond
the plain language of the statute was consistent with the expressed legislative
objective of protecting the immediate members of the alien's family from
extreme hardship."0 ' The court stressed that the grandchild's emotional at-
tachment to, and financial dependence on, the alien justified granting relief
in this instance. 202
While the alien's relationship to her grandchild in Tovar may have been
closely akin to that of parent to child, the statute leaves little room for flex-
ibility. The Act clearly defines the term child 03 and the Tovar court's con-
clusion did not respect that definition. The overriding consideration in Tovar
was not that the alien was the child's grandmother, but rather that the alien
and her grandchild were united as a family unit by a bond that normally
exists between parent and child. ' Nevertheless, it was not sufficient for
on public assistance for support); Faddah v. INS, 553 F.2d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 1977) (hardship
on children insufficient to suspend deportation when parent alien was not of good moral
character); Lee v. INS, 550 F.2d 554, 555-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (suspension of deportation denied
notwithstanding hardship to citizen child because alien father knowingly and illegally brought
wife into country).
198. See Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794, 797 (3rd Cir. 1980); Pelaez v. INS, 513 F.2d 303,
305 (5th Cir. 1975).
199. 612 F.2d 794 (3rd Cir. 1980).
200. Id. at 797.
201. Id. (citing Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979)).
202. Id. at 798.
203. In defining the term "child," the Act refers generally to an unmarried person under
21 years of age who is legitimate. In certain circumstances, a-child may also be a stepchild,
an illegitimate child, an adopted child or an orphan. See Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 101(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
204. 612 F.2d at 797. A logical extension of the Tovar court's rationale would expand the
statute's coverage to persons who are not even related to the alien. See Antoine-Dorcelli v.
INS, 703 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1983). In applying the analysis of Tovar to a situation in which the
alien sought relief on the basis of hardship to a non-relative, the Antoine-Dorcelli court declared:
It is all the more appropriate to apply such a substance over form analysis to the
question of the hardship to an alien resulting from separation from the only family
she has known, albeit not of the same blood, because of the breadth of the statutory
language relevant to this issue and the fact sensitive inquiry it requires. To distinguish
Tovar from the case before us on the basis that the alien and grandchild in Tovar
were related is to ignore the logic of that case's analysis.
Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW
the child to recognize the alien as her surrogate mother. Instead, the ques-
tion should have been whether the child involved was in fact the alien's child
within the meaning of the statute.
Although one can appreciate the motives of the court in Tovar, doubts
may be raised about the legitimacy of the court's statutory interpretation. '
The difficulty lies in dealing with the meaning of the word child elsewhere
in the Act.2"6 The problem is highlighted by the Act's definition of the term
immediate relatives."7 There is no mention in that definition of a grand-
child, and the term child is defined in relation to a parent."0 8 Never-
theless, if the Tovar definition is acceptable, then there is no reason why
a similarly expansive approach cannot be taken in other contexts.
The Third Circuit's liberal position in Tovar came under attack by the
Second Circuit in Chiaramonte v. INS.2"9 In that case, an alien was not
allowed to present evidence of extreme hardship to his father because the
alien was not a child under the statute and thus his father could not qualify
as a parent. 2 ' The restraint of the Chiaramonte court should be admired
only because the court recognized that it was beyond its lawful powers to
exceed the clear statutory designations of the Act. 2 ' Yet in resisting the im-
pulse to engage in such excesses, the court in Chiaramonte expressed some
sympathy for the position of the Tovar court because the latter was mindful
of the congressional concern for minors. 2 12 The Chiaramonte court was willing
to concede that "some latitude in construction of the statute to cover a
perhaps unforeseen situation, in order to benefit a child, may in fact fur-
ther the intent of Congress. '"2 '3 Nevertheless, the court was unwilling "to
205. The plain meaning rule requires language to be given its natural meaning unless restricted
by some other provision or inconsistent with legislative history. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note
45, at § 46.01. Further, statutory interpretation requires each part or section of a statute to
be construed with every other part or section to arrive at a "harmonious whole." Id. at § 46.05.
206. A few examples of how the Act deals with the status of a child include the following:
(I) a child of a United States citizen is classified as an immediate relative under § 201(b) and
is admitted as an immigrant without regard to the numerical limitations in the Act, Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976); (2) a child of a United States
citizen or of a lawful permanent resident who obtains a visa by fraud may obtain a waiver
of deportation, id. 241(f)(l)(A), § 1251(f)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981); and (3) a waiver of deporta-
tion is also possible for minor narcotic violations if an alien is the child of a citizen or of
a lawful permanent resident, id. 241(f)(2), § 1251(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
207. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976) provides in perti-
nent part: "The 'immediate relatives' referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall mean
the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States ... "
208. See id. § 101(b)(l)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l101(b)(l)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
209. 626 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980).
210. Id. at 1099-100. The court reasoned that the father could be a parent only by virtue
of a paternal relationship recognized under § 101(b)(l) and then only if the alien was unmar-
ried and under 21 years of age as required by § 101(b)(2). Id. at 1100 (citing Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1), (2), 8 U.S.C. § I 01(b)(1), (2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
211. Id.
212. Id. The Chiaramonte court found Tovar distinguishable because Tovar involved a minor.
Id.
213. Id.
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extrapolate from clearly and precisely defined statutory eligibility
requirements." 2' If the requirements are in fact so clear, then the extension
of eligibility to a grandchild in Tovar was unwarranted. 2
A different situation arises when an alien claims that he himself would
suffer extreme hardship because of separation from his family. Generally,
courts have been sympathetic to such situations.2 6 Recently, the First Cir-
cuit in Antoine-Dorcelli v. INS" 7 went even further and held that the Board
should consider whether an alien would suffer extreme hardship upon separa-
tion from a family with whom she had lived for many years, even though
the alien was not related to any member of that family. 2 8 The court's direc-
tion to the Board was consistent with language of the Act because a deci-
sion about the alien's hardship need not depend upon hardship to others,
but rather, can be based upon an alien's individual hardship.2 9 Therefore,
it was not necessary under the statute for the alien to be related to the family.
The court in Antoine-Dorcelli was not constrained by requirements that the
family with whom the alien lived must fall within any specific category. In-
stead, the question was whether the alien had established such a close rela-
tionship over the years with the family involved that a sudden separation
from it would constitute extreme hardship to her.22 Further, the court did
not have to rely on Tovar because in that case the alien claimed that the
hardship would fall not on herself, but on her grandchild. Consequently,
one can support the decision in Antoine-Dorcelli while disagreeing with the
decision in Tovar; there are no statutory constraints on a court's determina-
tion of the elements of extreme hardship, whereas the statute clearly specifies
those persons whose extreme hardship, suffered as a result of an alien's depor-
tation, might provide a basis for relief. 2 '
214. Id.
215. Id. The Chiaramonte court declared that a court should not substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature simply because the statute requires an unfortunate result in a specified
case. Id.; see also Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983) (court rejected
Tovar by refusing to consider the hardship of the son of a woman with whom the alien was
living and, instead, strictly construed the definition of "stepchild").
216. See Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981); Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d
101 (3rd Cir. 1979).
217. 703 F.2d 19 (lst Cir. 1983).
218. Id. at 21-22.
219. Suspension of deportation may be granted if the alien's deportation will result in ex-
treme hardship either to the alien himself or to his spouse, parent, or child. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also Barrera-
Leyva v. INS, 637 F.2d 640, 643 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980) (court rejects notion that hardship to
anyone other than alien, his spouse, parent or child should be recognized).
220. 703 F.2d at 22.
221. See Barrera-Leyva v. INS, 637 F.2d 640, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1980). Although hardship
should be considered only with respect to members of the specified class, separation from a
close family unit is relevant to the question of whether extreme hardship has been proved.
Id.; see also Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983) (alien's separation
from woman with whom he was living and her son should be considered in deciding whether
deportation would cause extreme hardship to the alien).
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The availability of section 244(a)(1) relief when stepchildren and illegitimate
children are involved depends upon whether such children are included in
the term child.222 Stepchildren are included under the Act's definition of
the term child-but at the time of a marriage, a child must be under the
age of eighteen to achieve the status of stepchild.223 Regarding illegitimate
children, the Board once held that only a mother's illegitimate children were
to be regarded as stepchildren. 124 In a subsequent district court opinion, a
father's illegitimate children came within the definition as long as there was
a preexisting family relationship. " Two years later, when the same federal
court decided that the Act did not require such a relationship, 2 ' the Service
unsuccessfully requested the Board to abandon the district court's previous
interpretation nationwide.2 7 Instead, the Board substituted its own formula
in In re Moreira,28 requiring that the petitioner exhibit an active interest
in the general welfare of the child whether born in or out of wedlock. The
Ninth Circuit, however, applied a more liberal interpretation to the statute
in Palmer v. Reddy22 9 by not requiring any evidence of parental interest or
of a family relationship. The Board then retreated from its position in
Moreira and agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision.23 ° The position now
adopted is that if the parent and the stepparent are divorced, the relation-
ship between the stepchild and the stepparent normally terminates. 3 ' If,
however, the stepparent and the stepchild continue a family relationship,
either after the divorce of the parent and the stepparent or after the death
of the parent, the relationship is still recognized for immigration purposes.23 '
222. A stepparent-stepchild relationship can be very important in the immigration context
because an illegitimate child can obtain or confer any benefit only through his mother. See
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of section 101(b)(l)(D),
8 U.S.C. § I101(B)(l)(D) (1976), which has the effect of excluding the relationship of father
and his illegitimate child from the relationships given special preference immigration status).
Thus, the father of an illegitimate child can cure this disability through marriage to the child's
stepmother before the child reaches the age of 18. In re McMillan, 17 1. & N. Dec. 605, 607
(1981).
223. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
224. In re W., 7 1. & N. Dec. 685, 687 (1958). An illegitimate child comes within the defini-
tion of stepchild, even if he is born after the marriage creating the stepparent-stepchild rela-
tionship. In re Stultz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 362 (1975).
225. Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (court looked at the broad language
used by Congress in defining the term "stepchildren" and found it to include a mother's,
as well as a father's, illegitimate children).
226. Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
227. In re Moreira, 17 1. & N. Dec. 41, 42 (1979).
228. Id. at 46.
229. 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit considered the plain language of the
Act and held that visa preference should be "available to stepchildren as a class without fur-
ther qualification." Id. at 464.
230. In re McMillan, 17 1. & N. Dec. 605 (1981).
231. In re Simicevic, 10 I. & N. 363 (1963).
232. See In re Mowrer, 17 1. & N. Dec. 613 (1981) (stepfather separated from the step-
children's natural mother); In re Pagnerre, 13 1. & N. Dec. 668 (1971) (death of natural parent).
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Although extreme hardship to a spouse is a relevant consideration, the
Act does not define the term spouse. Nevertheless, the Act specifically pro-
vides that someone who is a party to an unconsummated marriage should
not be considered a spouse.2 3 Thus, even if a marriage complies with the
formalities of the jurisdiction where it occurs, it will not be recognized as
a valid marriage if the parties intended it solely as a method of obtaining
immigration benefits.23 ' In the past, the Board insisted that a marriage must
be found viable and subsisting if it were to be the basis for immigration
benefits."3 This viability requirement, however, did not find favor with the
courts236 and it was not long before the Board reversed its position.237 It
is now generally accepted that an alien can seek immigration benefits on
the basis of his relationship to a spouse from whom he is separated.238
Therefore, even if the marriage is not viable, the possibility of proving ex-
treme hardship under section 244 is not foreclosed as long as there has been
no legal dissolution. The viability of the marriage, however, may be rele-
233. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1976).
234. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953). It is within the authority of the
INS to determine whether an alien entered a marriage to evade the immigration laws. See,
e.g., Skelly v. INS, 630 F.2d 1375, 1382 (10th Cir. 1980) (marriage validly performed under
Oklahoma law held invalid for immigration purposes); Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236,
1238 (9th Cir. 1979) (valid marriage under New Mexico law is invalid for immigration purposes
when substantial evidence shows it is a sham); De Figueroa v. INS, 501 F.2d 191, 195 (7th
Cir. 1974) (valid marriage under Illinois law does not, in itself, exempt an alien from deporta-
tion); Kokkinis v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Serv., New York, New
York and Buffalo, New York, 429 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1970) (where alien entered valid
marriage solely to facilitate his receipt of a visa, he is deportable); see also Adams v. Hower-
ton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038-40 (9th Cir.) (even if state law validates a homosexual marriage,
it is insufficient to confer spouse status for purposes of federal immigration law), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 3494 (1982).
235. See In re Kitsalis, 11. & N. Dec. 613 (1966) (visa petition denied because valid mar-
riage did not exist); In re Lew, I1 1. & N. Dec. 148 (1965) (adjustment of status denied where
interlocutory divorce granted).
236. See Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1979) (marriage valid for pur-
poses of eligibility under § 245 until legally dissolved); Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303, 1306-07
(9th Cir. 1977) (fiancee can adjust to permanent residence even though separation occurred
within 30 days); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1975) (adjustment to permanent
residence not precluded even though parties separated after marriage); Chan v. Bell, 464 F.
Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978) (visa petition should not be denied because parties lived apart). But
see Kalezic v. INS, 647 F.2d 920, 922-23 (9th Cir. 1981) (section 241(f) waiver of deportability
unavailable where citizen spouse had revoked visa petition and had started divorce proceedings).
237. In re McKee, 17 1. & N. Dec. 332 (1980) (separation is not a valid basis for denial
of visa petition).
238. In re Pierce, 17 1. & N. Dec. 456 (1980) (alien seeking preference on basis of marriage
is not excludable simply because of.separation from spouse); In re Boromand, 17 1. & N.
Dec. 450 (1980) (rescission of adjustment denied even though alien stated falsely that he was
living with his wife, since misstatement about viability of marriage was not material to ad-
missibility); In re Adalatkhah, 17 1. & N. Dec. 404 (1980) (alien found to be an "immediate
relative" within § 245 despite being separated from spouse). But cf. In re Lenning, 17 1. &
N. Dec. 476 (1980) (where separation agreement can be converted into a divorce decree, the
marriage no longer exists).
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vant to the establishment of extreme hardship because in the absence of a
close domestic relationship it may be difficult for an alien to meet his burden
of proof and, thus, the likelihood of eligibility for suspension of deporta-
tion would be decreased. In other words, if a marriage is factually dead,
it may be difficult to prove extreme hardship even if the alien can show
that he has a spouse within the meaning of the statute.
c. Continuous Physical Presence
Another of the requirements under section 244(a)(1) is the alien's physical
presence in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years.239 An alien's brief excursion outside the United States may cause him
difficulty in meeting the continuous residence requirement if it is "mean-
ingfully interruptive. 24 ' Early decisions regarded an alien's departure from
the United States as meaningfully interruptive even if it was brief and casual.
In United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith," ' the frailty of an alien's status
was exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the deportation
of an alien who had made a brief trip to Cuba. 242 The Court considered
"any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States
whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one" to be an "entry"
subjecting the alien to the hazards of the exclusion and deportation
provisions. 4
3
The strictness of the Volpe approach was apparent in Di Pasquale v.
Karnuth,1" where the Second Circuit was confronted with the case of an
alien whose train took him on an overnight ride through Canada on the
way from Buffalo to Detroit. " ' Had the Second Circuit taken the Volpe
approach, it would have regarded the alien's return as an entry. There was,
however, no evidence that the alien knew that he was leaving the United
States and thus, the arrival in Detroit after a temporary excursion through
Canadian territory was not considered an entry. " '
239. For the text of section 244(a)(1), see supra note 13.
240. The Supreme Court recently discussed the question of whether an alien's excursion out-
side the United States was "meaningfully interruptive" in Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct.
321 (1982). The Court, maintaining that the alien's intent was an important factor, declared
that when an alien leaves the United States for purposes that are contrary to the policies of
the immigration laws, that absence meaningfully interrupts the alien's residence. Id. at 327
(quoting Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963)).
241. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
242. Volpe had gone to Cuba without a passport and remained there for only a few days
before returning to the United States. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 62 F.2d 808, 809
(7th Cir. 1933). Further, Volpe had been convicted of counterfeiting while lawfully in the United
States and, thus, was deportable for the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.
289 U.S. at 423-24.
243. 289 U.S. at 425.
244. 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
245. The alien had served two prison terms for robbery, a crime involving moral turpitude,
and would have been deportable upon reentry. Id. at 878.
246. Id. at 879. The problem of working out a realistic definition of "entry" was also at
issue in Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947). In Delgadillo, the hazards of war took
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Eventually Congress defined the term entry in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.2 4 7 The definition assured that at least the unintended or in-
voluntary departure of a lawful permanent resident would not result in an
entry when the alien returned. It is noteworthy, however, that the definition
included no exception for a trip abroad which was brief and casual.
Therefore, it remained for the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti2" to
further clarify the term entry. The Court found that an alien who had ven-
tured to Mexico for a few hours had not meaningfully interrupted his per-
manent residence because the trip was "innocent, casual, and brief."2 '9 Thus,
when the alien returned, there was no entry because the Court maintained
that it was as if he had never left. The Court declared that the dominant
factors for determining meaningful interruption are the length of the alien's
absence, the purpose of his visit and the necessity of obtaining travel
documents.25
After Fleuti, courts took turns grappling with the factors laid out in that
case.2"' For example, in Itzcovitz v. Selective Service,2"2 an alien, prior to
his three-week departure, obtained a declaratory judgment providing that
his return would not constitute an entry within the meaning of section
101(a)(13) of the Act.253 The obtaining of a declaratory judgment prior to
departure ordinarily militates against an alien's contention that his trip was
casual. The court, however, did not hold this factor against him and, thus,
there was no meaningful interruption of the alien's residence.25 4
an alien beyond American territory to Cuba for one week. Id. at 389. The Court did not
regard the alien's return as an entry because his departure was involuntary. Id. at 390.
247. For the definition of entry, see supra note 4.
248. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
249. Id. at 461-62. Deportation proceedings had been brought against Fleuti for conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude under § 212(a)(9) of the Act and subsequently on the
ground that he was "afflicted with psychopathic personality" and excludable under § 212(a)(4)
because he was a homosexual. Id. at 450-51.
250. 374 U.S. at 462.
251. See, e.g., McColvin v. INS, 648 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1981) (one day departure under
threat of deportation is meaningfully interruptive of alien's continuous presence in the United
States); Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (two trips to Thailand
for a total absence of 14 months is meaningfully interruptive of alien's stay in the United
States); Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977) (short trip to Mexico is mean-
ingfully interruptive of alien's permanent residence when alien assisted five aliens to enter the
United States illegally); Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.) (aliens' six week trip to Ger-
many precluded them from showing seven years of continuous presence in the United States),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977)
(alien's brief trip to Mexico for the purpose of aiding illegal entry of aliens is meaningfully
interruptive of his resident alien status); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974)
(27-day trip to Colombia to be married constitutes a meaningful interruption of the alien's
permanent residence); Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (alien's trip to
Mexico to make a condolence call did not interrupt his residential status).
252. 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971)..
253. Id. at 891.
254. Id. at 894 (the court gave little weight to the fact that the alien obtained a declaratory
judgment because the purpose of the trip was "bona fide, honorable, and lawful").
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Another case in which the Fleuti factors were considered was Heitland
v. INS.2" Heitland presented a slightly different twist because the aliens were
in the United States illegally and had ventured to Germany for six weeks
to visit an ailing relative.256 The Second Circuit agreed with the Board that
this six-week trip abroad broke the seven-year continuous residence require-
ment, and it denied the alien's eligibility under section 244(a)(l). 2" The court
seemed concerned that the aliens should not benefit from their illegal status
in the United States. 58 Further, the Second Circuit was impressed by the
aliens' careful planning, including their efforts to obtain documents for their
travels abroad.259 Such actions reflected deliberate conduct and not an inno-
cent foray into foreign territory. In addition, the aliens compounded their
transgression by securing reentry into the United States through deceptive
methods. '6" This combination of events-the aliens' illegal presence in the
United States, the length of their stay abroad, and their deceptive reentry-
convinced the court that these aliens had experienced a meaningful interrup-
tion of their residence in this country, thus disqualifying them from relief
under section 244(a)(1).26' It is questionable, however, whether the aliens'
illegal status in the United States should have had an adverse effect upon
their eligibility for relief. The statutory purpose of section 244(a)(1) is
frustrated by a policy that looks with disfavor on the aliens' illegal status,
because the possibility of suspension of deportation was meant for all aliens
who are subject to deportation. 6 By excluding illegal aliens from considera-
tion, the number of eligible aliens would be decimated.
The Fleuti issues were confronted again in Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS.263
In that case, the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether the alien's one
month trip to Thailand was meaningfully interruptive of his residence in
the United States.""4 While an immigration judge had applied the Fleuti test
strictly and determined that the alien did not fulfill the continuous residence
requirement, the court disagreed that the criteria considered in Fleuti should
be determinative. 65 Instead, the court suggested a refinement of the Fleuti
test to determine the significance of an alien's absence from the United States.
The new test provided the following guideline:
255. 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
256. Id. at 497. The aliens had been in the United States for two years before going to
Germany.
257. Id. at 501.
258. Id. at 502.
259. The court stated that "[iun order to proceed to Germany, the petitioners had to obtain
passports and visas, which is a far cry from the situation in Fleuti." Id.
260. Id. at 502-03.
261. Id. at 504.
262. The Board has held that an alien's original illegal entry should not affect findings as
to an alien's continuous physical presence. I,' re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 271 (1967).
263. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
264. Id. at 1255.
265. Id. at 1257 (declaring that the Fleuti factors were "only evidentiary" for the purpose
of determining the effect of an absence on the continuous residence requirement).
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An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully interruptive of the whole
period if indications are that the hardship of deportation to the alien would
be equally severe had the absence not occurred, and that no significant
increase in the likelihood of deportation could reasonably have been ex-
pected to flow from the manner and circumstances surrounding the
absence. 266
It was inevitable that the Supreme Court would have to deal with the
"continuous physical presence" requirement. That opportunity came in INS
v. Phinpathya,2 61 when the Service challenged the Ninth Circuit's decision
in a case involving an alien's three-month trip abroad. The Ninth Circuit,
being sympathetic with the Kamheangpatiyooth criteria, had found that the
Board overemphasized the alien's illegal status and the increased likelihood
of deportation that flowed from her absence, and it remanded for further
proceedings on the continuous physical presence question.2 68
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding in effect
that the language continuous physical presence must be literally interpreted
and that any absence from the United States breaks the continuity required
under section 244(a)(1).
The Court opted for the ordinary meaning of the statutory language and
found that the statute did not leave any room for an exception to the con-
tinuous physical presence requirement.2 69 The Court took the view that when
Congress wanted to provide flexibility in the application of the continuous
physical presence requirement, it included statutory language to accomplish
that objective.27 Furthermore, it seemed that Congress intended a more
266. Id. The court, in suggesting the new test, maintained that the distance travelled or the
time spent abroad should not result in any conclusive presumption of a break in the alien's
continuity of residence. Id. at 1257-58. But see Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (alien's arrangement to have her family join her abroad for an in-
definite period of time held to be meaningfully interruptive of residence in United States).
The Kamheangpatiyooth court's approach was realistic in several respects. First, it was realistic
in that an alien's fate should not depend upon his destination. In other words, an alien who
travels to the other side of the world should not need to fear automatic exclusion. Further,
the court refused to hold that since the alien had obtained travel documents, his trip could
not be viewed as causal. 597 F.2d at 1295. Instead, the court took the practical view that
when the alien had obtained a new student visa and a certificate of attendance at his school,
he had done everything possible to assure the continuity of his residence. Id.
267. 52 U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984).
268. Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,
52 U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984). The court rejected the idea that the alien's absence
must be found meaningfully interruptive simply because one of the Kamheangpatiyooth factors
was missing. Id. at 1018.
269. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4029 (citing McColvin v. INS, 648 F.2d 935, 937 (4th Cir. 1981) (alien's
one-day absence held meaningfully interruptive)).
270. The Court cited former section 301(b) of the Act, which required two years of con-
tinuous physical presence for a foreign-born United States citizen to maintain his citizenship
but provided that an absence from the United States of less than 60 days did not break the
continuity of presence. See Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. 92-584, § 1, 86 Stat. 1289, repealed
by Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. 95-432, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046.
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stringent application when it changed the statutory requirement in 1952 from
"continuous residence" to "continuous physical presence.''27
The alien could find no comfort in the Court's Fleuti decision. In Fleuti,
the Court had to deal with a statutory exception272 to the "entry" doctrine
which was enacted to counteract prior strict judicial views about the
significance of an alien's absence.2"3 Thus, the Court felt that a flexible ap-
proach to the construction of the term entry in section 101(a)(13) was justified
in Fleuti.274 On the other hand, section 244(a)(1) itself set a restrictive
threshold requirement concerning an alien's continuity of physical presence
that must be met before the Attorney General can exercise his discretion.275
The Court concluded, therefore, that the Fleuti decision was essentially ir-
relevant in the context of the suspension remedy.276
The alien urged the Court to recognize that the Ninth Circuit's views of
what constitutes a meaningful interruption of an alien's presence were con-
sistent with the ameliorative aspects of the suspension remedy.277 Unfortu-
nately, when the Ninth Circuit related the meaningful interruption of the
hardship of deportation, it unwittingly involved another requirement of the
suspension, i.e., extreme hardship. The Court found it difficult, therefore,
to read this "hardship" element into the continuous physical presence re-
quirement when "extreme hardship" itself was a separate statutory
requirement. 7 ' It feared that the continuous physical presence requirement
might become redundant under these circumstances.
It was significant that the Service did not press for a literal reading of
the statute. It thought that the court of appeals had interpreted the statute
too liberally. As a matter of fact, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall and Justice Stevens, reminded the Court in a concurring opinion that
the Service had admitted that there was room for flexibility in interpreting
the statute.7 9 Thus, while agreeing with the Court's judgment that the alien
did not qualify for relief, Justice Brennan did not think it necessary that
the Court reach the question of whether the continuous physical presence
requirement should be literally interpreted.28 °
271. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1653; S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, 25 (1952).
272. Although an "entry" is defined as ":any coming of an alien into the United States,"
a lawful permanent resident is not regarded as making an entry if his departure was not intended
or reasonably to be expected by him. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(13).
273. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4030 (citing Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 457-62).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. The Court stated that "[tlhe language and history of [section 244(a)(1)] suggest
that 'continuous physical presence' and 'extreme hardship' are separate preconditions for a
suspension of deportation." Id.
279. Id. at 4031 & n.l (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing In re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 271
(1967)).
280. Id.
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Justice Brennan recognized that formerly there was a sixty-day exception
to the continuous physical presence requirement for foreign-born citizens who
wanted to avoid losing their citizenship. He did not interpret the lack of
a similar provision in the suspension provision as an indication that Con-
gress wanted to require the alien to be physically present at all times in the
United States.28" ' As the Court pointed out, however, this previous exception
indicated that Congress knew how to relax the requirement of the continuity
of physical presence, and it is reasonable to conclude that the absence of
such mitigating language demonstrates that Congress intended strict com-
pliance with the statutory language.2"2 Furthermore, when Congress changed
the requirement from "continuous residence" to "continuous physical
presence," it signalled its intention to halt the prior statutory abuses.28 3 Never-
theless, it is entirely possible that Congress overreacted by using language
that foreclosed even the briefest excursion into foreign territory.284 Justice
Brennan was convinced that Congress did not intend to go to that extreme.28" '
Perhaps that was not its intent, but the context of th statutory amendment
led the Court to believe that Congress knew what it was doing. Thus, if
there is to be some exception to this harsh application of the suspension
provision, there must be legislative action either to deal with an alien's casual
and brief absences or to give an alien some leeway, however slight, in comply-
ing with the continuous physical presence requirement.
d. Good Moral Character
Another requirement of eligibility for relief under section 244(a)(1) is that
of good moral character. The Act gives some guidance as to what this re-
quirement means by listing those patterns of conduct which preclude a find-
ing of good moral character.286 The listing, however, is not intended to be
exclusive, and a failure to find good moral character may be predicated on
conduct not specifically identified in the Act.287
281. Id.
282. See id. at 4029.
283. Congress replaced the "continuous residence" requirement with the "continuous physical
presence" requirement "in an attempt to discontinue lax practices and discourage abuses."
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1653; see 52 U.S.L.W. at 4029.
284. This was the kind of predicament that led to the problem in Fleuti. In that case, the
issue concerned the meaning of the term intended in the statutory context of the definition
of entry.
285. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4032-33 (Brennan, J., concurring).
286. Examples of conduct which preclude a finding of good moral character are habitual
drunkenness, deriving one's income from illegal gambling and being convicted of murder. Im-
migration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(l)(4)(8), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(f)(1)(4)(8) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
287, See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 32, § 7.9d, at 7-158 to 7-159 (examples
of conduct outside statutory listing which have been considered in determining whether an alien
lacks good moral character include the following: being on parole or probation ; neglecting
family responsibilities; engaging in extramarital affairs; and engaging in illegal activities).
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A significant circumstance identified in the Act that will give rise to a
finding that an alien is not of good moral character is a conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.288 The Board has determined that such a
conviction exists for immigration purposes when the following elements are
present: (1) the court has found the alien guilty; (2) the court imposes a
fine or imprisonment or suspends sentence; and (3) the state characterizes
the court's action as a conviction to some extent. 89 However, when a court
withholds adjudication of guilt under a state statute and discharges an alien
without conviction after a satisfactory probation, there is no conviction for
immigration purposes. 9 Further, an alien's guilty plea will not be regarded
as an admission of the crime in that situation because there was no ad-
judication of guilt according to the statute."'
Another circumstance operating against a finding of good moral character
under the Act is giving false testimony to obtain immigration benefits. 9 '
While this provision seems clear on its face, the issue has arisen as to what
constitutes testimony. In Phinpathya v. INS,293 the court held that an alien's
false statements made in her application for suspension of deportation were
not testimony within the meaning of section 101(f)(6).294 The court defined
testimony as evidence given under oath to prove a fact to a court or a
tribunal, and distinguished testimony from evidence obtained from writings
and similar sources.295 Nevertheless, the court's conclusion that the alien's
288. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (1976 & Supp. V
1981). "Moral turpitude" has been defined by the Board as "anything done contrary to justice,
honesty, principle, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general." In re Sloan,
12 1. & N. Dec. 840, 849 (1968). In a more recent decision, the Board described moral tur-
pitude as "a nebulous concept which refers generally to conduct which is generally base, vile,
or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between man and
man, either one's fellow man or society in general." In re Flores, 17 1. & N. Dec. 225, 227
(1980) (citations omitted). In determining whether a conviction under a statute involves moral
turpitude, it is necessary to consider whether "intent" is an essential element of the crime.
See In re Zangwill, Int. Dec. 2858 (1981) (where statutory prohibition against issuing worthless
checks only required that the issuance be "knowing" and there was no requirement that there
be intent to defraud, a conviction under the statute did not give rise to a finding of moral
turpitude).
289. See In re Seda, 17 1. & N. Dec. 550, 552 (1980); In re Robinson, 16 1. & N. Dec.
762, 763 (1979); In re Varagianis, 16 1. & N. Dec. 48, 49 (1976).
290. In re Seda, 17 1. & N. Dec. 550, 553-54 (1980) (alien's sentence of five years probation
for forgery under Georgia Statewide Probation Act was not considered a conviction).
291. Id. at 554. The Seda Board declared that where a guilty plea did not amount to a
conviction, it also could not be regarded as an admission. Id. But see In re Zangwill, Int.
Dec. 2858 (1981) (alien deemed convicted for immigration purposes although there was no ad-
judication of guilt where the alien pleaded guilty to issuing worthless checks and the state statute
did not provide for exoneration after completion of probation).
292. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(")(6) (1976).
293. 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 52 U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. Jan.
10, 1984).
294. Id. at 1018-20.
295. Id. at 1019.
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statements in the application were not false testimony did not deprive the
Board of its discretion in deciding whether to suspend the alien's deporta-
tion under section 244(a)(1).296
Prior to the 1981 amendments to the Act, section 101(f) precluded a find-
ing of good moral character for an alien who committed adultery.2 97 The
amendments recognized the difficulty of strictly enforcing section 101(f)(2)
and deleted the ground of adultery as one which automatically precludes
a finding of good moral character.29 This change simply allows the Attorney
General to exercise his discretion with respect to an alien's individual cir-
cumstances, and therefore still permits a finding based on adultery that an
alien has failed to meet the standard of "good moral character." 2 99 Similarly,
the courts may feel more comfortable in looking to see whether the alien's
adulterous conduct has destroyed an otherwise viable marriage. °0
Congress also liberalized section 101(f)(3), which previously precluded a
finding of good moral character for those aliens who have been found guilty
of possessing or trafficking in drugs.3"' Presently, an alien who is convicted
of "a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marihuana"
may still be regarded as a person of good moral character.30 2 This was a
genuine attempt on the part of Congress to distinguish between aliens who
are habitual users and traffickers of drugs and aliens who are not.
CONCLUSION
The review of section 212(c) undertaken here has suggested that in deter-
mining the period of lawful domicile, account should be taken of the period
preceding, as well as following, an alien's admission for permanent residence.
Further, this article illustrates that the section was intended to apply to any
alien who has the status of a lawful permanent resident at the time he seeks
to return to that lawful domicile. The section was meant to alleviate the
296. Id. (recognizing that evaluation of false statements is one of the numerous factors that
the Board can consider in exercising its discretion).
297. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (1976), amended
by Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
298. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
299. The following comments were made about the impact of the amendment deleting adultery
from section 101(f)(2):
Presently if a couple is legally separated and one person cohabits with another who
is not his spouse he will automatically be barred from becoming a citizen. This
change is designed to remedy the above situation. If adultery is found to be the
primary cause of the destruction of a viable marriage or is found to result in children
becoming public charges the offender will still be found lacking the necessary moral
character.
127 CONG. REC. S15525 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
300. See Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d
812 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Trujillo, 16 1. & N. Dec. 453 (1977).
301. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (Supp. V 1981) (amend-
ing Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(3) (1976)).
302. Id.
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hardship which might ensue from the unexpected exclusion of aliens with
long residence and strong ties to the United States. Therefore, it was ap-
propriate for the Second Circuit in Lok I to allow the alien to include the
period prior to his lawful admission for permanent residence as a part of
the required lawful domicile. Such an approach satisfies congressional con-
cerns that an alien should be eligible for 212(c) relief only if he normally
would qualify for admission. In addition, these principles are fully applicable
to aliens whose domicile in the United States began during their nonimmigrant
status.
This article also considered section 244(a)(1), which provides a substantial
measure of relief for those aliens who find themselves subject to deporta-
tion. With respect to this section, there has been notable progress in dealing
with the elements of extreme hardship. The Supreme Court's verdict in Wang
established the Attorney' General and his delegates as the proper arbiters
of extreme hardship. In so doing, it imposed on the lower courts the respon-
sibility of deciding whether the Board has abused its discretion in particular
cases. Thus, the courts' function is not to impose their own views of ex-
treme hardship on the administrative tribunal. Yet, the Board is required
to make its determination based on the totality of circumstances and, if it
has not done so, the courts can rightfully find that the Board abused its
discretion.
The Supreme Court has now given the last word on the continuous physical
presence requirement. If aliens are to obtain any relief from the Court's
strict interpretation, it obviously must come from Congress. There is need
for an amendment that will provide the necessary flexibility for the courts.
Only time will tell whether Congress really intended this literal interpretation.
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